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POLITICAL ALCHEMY, THE LONG TRANSITION,
AND LAW'S PROMISED EMPIRE: HOW JULY 1, 1997
MATTERS - AND DOESN'T MATTER - IN HONG
KONG'S RETURN TO CHINA
JACQUES DELISLE*
1. INTRODUCTION
At midnight on June 30, 1997, the billboard-size digital clock
that stands in front of the Museum of the Revolution and the
Museum of History at Beijing's Tiananmen Square will reach zero
in its countdown to China's "resumption of the exercise of
sovereignty over Hong Kong."' More than a thousand miles
away, the Union Jack will have been lowered for the last time
over Government House in Hong Kong, and official celebrations
will begin, marking China's recovery of the second greatest of the
remaining prizes in its long march toward national reunification
and the recovery of lost lands.2  The "borrowed place on bor-
rowed time"3 will have ended its century-and-a-half run as a
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author
thanks the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for supporting
work on this article and the author's broader collaborative project on Hong
Kong, 1997, on which this article draws. The author also thanks Jennifer Shiu-
Li Fan and Richard Sik-Wing Au for providing excellent and efficient research
assistance.
I The phrase originated in The Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong
Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543),
para. 1 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
2 Taiwan is, of course, the most' important object of the P.R.C.'s
reunification drive. Indeed, China's handling of Hong Kong's return is widely
seen as an audition for prospective reunification with Taiwan - a feature which
some see as the best guarantee Hong Kong has that P.R.C. authorities will
restrain themselves and respect the promised "high degree of autonomy" for the
S.A.R. Macao, the other remaining colonial outpost on the south China coast,
is set to return in 1999, when Portuguese rule - long-since largely ceded in
practice to P.R.C. authorities - will formally terminate.
' The phrase, originating with Chinese author Han Suyin, has stuck as an
apt description of the city-state's predicament. See, e.g., RICHARD HUGHES,
BORROWED PLACE, BORROWED TIME: HONG KONG AND ITS MANY FACES
(1968).
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British colony and become the first Special Administrative Region
("S.A.R.") within the People's Republic of China ("China" or
"P.R.C."). Such a theatrical and formally transformative moment
inescapably draws our attention, prompting us to call together
symposia to assess its meaning and implications. It provides a
compelling occasion for the contributors to this volume and for
countless other participants in - and observers of - Hong Kong
affairs to examine the prospects for the people and places most
affected by those changes. It also presents an opportunity for
attracting notice from a world in which seemingly more gradual
developments of the same magnitude can be driven from the stage
by the fleeting crises of the day.
Less certain is what this moment of high drama will mean -
for Hong Kong itself, for the P.R.C., and for a watching world.
July 1, 1997, does indeed loom as a defining moment when viewed
from a perspective that sees the profound contrasts between the
People's Republic and the crown colony as mattering most, and
regards the implementation of the S.A.R.'s political and legal
structure as a principal means for bridging or accommodating
those differences in the immediate aftermath of reversion. The
official date of reversion recedes into relative insignificance,
however, from a perspective that stresses points of similarity,
convergence, and gradual integration across the soon-to-vanish
international border, and that is skeptical about whether much
turns on the introduction of new formal institutions and laws for
"Hong Kong, China."4 From a third perspective, the arrange-
ments for Hong Kong's return to China are remarkable for the
extraordinarily central role they appear to accord to law and legal
forms. Whether "law" succeeds or fails in performing those roles,
on this view, is a matter of great material and normative signifi-
cance for Hong Kong, the P.R.C., and for the international
community - in general, and especially in those segments that
value the rule of law.
4 That awkward appellation is what the Basic Law authorizes the S.A.R.
to use in post-1997 participation in international relations, organizations, and
treaty-like arrangements. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, annex I, S XI;
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Manggang Tebie Xingzheng Qu Jiben Fa [The
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Aministrative Region of the People's
Republic of China], Apr. 4, 1990, art. 150 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
FALO FAGUi (Huoye) 1-4-0-1., translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520 [hereinafter Basic
Law].
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Which of the divergent predictions rooted in the first pair of
perspectives will prove nearer the truth, and to what degree law
can play the promised roles that are the focus of the third
perspective, all depend on answers to questions that do not yet
yield widely convincing answers - and may not for years to
come. Nonetheless, each of these three perspectives sheds light on
some facet of Hong Kong in transition and points us to issues that
are likely to matter well beyond 1997 - for Hong Kong, for
China, and for others with significant material and normative
stakes in what happens to Hong Kong.
2. Political Alchemy: The Interaction Of Opposites and the
Institutional Solution
Hong Kong's return to China is no "ordinary" change of
sovereignty or regime. It is not simply a latter-day echo of the
once commonplace negotiated transfer of power from a withdraw-
ing imperial power to new rulers with a different de jure and de
facto approach to law and governance. Such a change would be
remarkable in Hong Kong's case only for having come so long
after the main wave of post-World War II decolonization and for
resulting in an arrangement other than independence for the
territory.' More than mere tardiness distinguishes Hong Kong's
impending transition from colonial rule. Britain's "restor[ation]
of Hong Kong" to China, and China's simultaneous "resum[ption
of] the exercise of sovereignty" over Hong Kong - and the
undertakings to do so under the terms set forth in the Sino-British
Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and the Basic
Law for the Hong Kong S.A.R. - appear to herald a moment of
political alchemy, with "political" read broadly. July 1, 1997
s On Hong Kong's anomalous status in this regard, see generally HURST
HANNUM, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF DETERMINATION 129-51 (rev. ed. 1996).
6 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 1 & 2. The phrasing of paragraph
1 reflects China's position that the "unequal treaties" ceding sovereignty over
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon as well as granting a ninety-nine-year lease on
the New Territories) were invalid, and that China accordingly had always
remained Hong Kong's sovereign. The Joint Declaration, therefore, could not
be a sovereignty-(re)transferring treaty. It merely provided the occasion for
China's establishing a time-table for beginning again to exercise the legal power
it had never relinquished. Paragraph 2, in contrast, reflects the British position
that the first two treaties were valid, sovereignty-transferring instruments and
the Joint Declaration was an agreement of equal dignity effecting the return to
China of sovereignty over the territory.
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thus promises, and threatens, to be the moment when seemingly
antithetical elements of two radically different systems must
finally be thrust together - and the elaborate legal and institution-
al vessels constructed to contain their interaction tested - with
unpredictable consequences.
2.1. Economics: Contrasts and Gaps
The points of undeniable contrast and possible incompatibility
between the "two systems" (liangzhz) that will be formally
integrated in "one country" (yiguo) are wide-ranging and fairly
fundamental.7 In the economic realm, Hong Kong and the
P.R.C. face obvious challenges in bridging ideological and
economic gaps, and related differences in legal and institutional
structures. Although Hong Kong has been a less pure bastion of
laissez-faire principles than is popularly imagined, it remains a
near-paragon of free-market capitalism, lightly regulated internally
and strikingly open to the global economy. The colony's civil
service-dominated government is widely regarded - and regards
itself - as committed to facilitating commerce and business and
to maintaining a legal regime of low taxes, zero tariffs (on all but
a handful of goods), and free investment flows for the territory
while supporting a liberal economic order at multilateral and
global levels. Government forays into "industrial policy" have
been limited, confined to such modest measures as providing
infrastructure, offering discounted land leases to encourage the
development of industrial estates, and disseminating information
or providing advice to business on prospective growth industries,
trade, and investment! Local companies are easily established
' Deng Xiaoping first articulated the formula of "one country, two
systems" (yiguo, liangzhi) as a recipe for reunification of Taiwan with mainland
China. The phrase was adopted- to summarize the P.R.C.'s policy on Hong
Kong, and is ubiquitous in the discourse on post-1997 Hong Kong, is enshrined
in the preamble to the Basic Law, is liberally laced in policy statements by
politicians and officials of every hue, and even lends its name to a prominent
"pro-China" think tank in Hong Kong (the "One Country Two Systems
Economic Research Institute").
8 See, e.g., STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE
POLTICS OF GROWTH IN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 151-53, 200
(1990); NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLiTICS OF HONG
KONG 4749 (5th ed. 1995); EZRA F. VOGEL, THE FOUR DRAGONS: THE
SPREAD OF INDUSTRIALiZATION IN EAST ASIA 70-72 (1991).
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and face few restrictions on their scope of business activities.'
Government control of capital flows is so minimal that official
statistics are concededly uncertain. 0 As a result of such traits,
the territory consistently rates at the top of indices of "economic
freedom," international economic openness and foreign trade-
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") ratios, and has succeeded in
attracting hundreds of multinational corporations to make the
territory their base for East Asian or Southeast Asian regional
operations."
In its official norms and the rules and institutions that
implement them, China's economic system remains strikingly
different. While "economic system reform" (jingji tizhi gaige) and,
more recently, the construction of a "socialist market economy"
(shehuizhuyi shichang jingi) have been central pillars of P.R.C.
policy during two decades of reform, China's economy remains
socialist in key respects. 12  The role of central planning has
plummeted from the relatively pale imitation of Soviet economics
that characterized the high Maoist era. The share of GDP
produced by state enterprises (defined very narrowly) has fallen
steadily, to less than half of industrial output in recent years, and
new laws have provided those enterprises with greater rights to
operational autonomy and a mechanism for converting into share-
issuing corporations.13 At the same time, China's policy of
9 On recent changes to make the Companies Ordinance still less restrictive,
see Nick Tabakoff, Companies Win More Freedom in Ordinance Overhaul, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 11, 1997, at 2.
10 See, e.g., HAGGARD, supra note 8, at 203.
1 See, e.g., HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 1997 INDEX OF ECONOMIC
FREEDOM 220 (1996); Sharon Cheung Po-wah, Territory is in Top Three for
Openness, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 6, 1995, at 12; Bruce Gilley, Just in
Case... FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 8, 1996, at 53 (concerning multinational
companies with Hong Kong regional headquarters); U.S. Businessmen Confident
in HK Commercial Proects, Xinhua News Agency, Sept. 19, 1994, in BBC,
Survey of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File
(reporting on American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong statement) .
12 See, e.g., Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market
Structure (1993).
1 See generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN:
CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM 1978-1993 26-51, 329-33 (1995); Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Quanmin Suoyouzhi Gongye Qiye Fa [P.R.C. Law on
State-Owned Enterprises] (1988) [hereinafter Qiye Fa]; Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [P.R.C. Company Law] (1993) [hereinafter Gongsi Fa].
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"opening to the outside world" (duiwai kaifang) has brought
rapidly rising levels of foreign investment and trade, and the con-
struction of a framework of laws that are at least partially
compatible with international standards. 14
Still, significant elements of planning and direct political
control persist. Formally, China still issues Five Year Plans for
the economy, which articulate the leadership's general economic
policies (if not meaningful specific directives). Several key
commodities have remained partially subject to production quotas
and price controls. Some of the most massive and unreformed
state companies loom large in key economic sectors and, there-
fore, in the leadership's fiscal and reform policy calculations.
Especially at the local level, even nominally non-"state-owned"
enterprises are often controlled by organs and officials of the
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP" or "Party") and government
institutions, or by people closely connected to them. And many
large enterprises must retain underemployed workers and provide
a vast range of social services and benefits that many workers
would be unable to afford on the market and that the cash-
strapped government cannot or will not absorb as more direct
expenditures from national welfare and social security budgets."5
The points of contrast and potential friction between Hong
Kong and China in the economic sphere reflect more than matters
of ideology or "system type." Differences in levels of develop-
ment matter as well. Simply put, Hong Kong is a highly
14 See generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC
REFORM IN CHINA, 1978-1990 37-104 (1992); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Zhongwai Heze Jingying Qiye Fa [Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of
the P.R.C.] (1979, amended 1990); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waize Qiye
Fa (1986) [Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law of the P.R.C.]; Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Duiwai Maoyi Fa [Foreign Trade Law of the P.R.C.]
(1994).
15 For extensive discussions of these issues, see, e.g., NAUGHTON, supra
note 13, at 220-27, 282-83, 289-91, 294-98 (discussing planning and pricing and
the gradual progress toward policy of laying off workers and providing
unemployment compensation); SUSAN L. SHiRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF
ECONOMIC REFORM 280-308 (1993) (examining sectoral interests and their
impact on reform policies and laws); Susan L. Shirk, The Politics of Industrial
Reform, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA 195,
204-21 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Christine Wong eds., 1985); Lucy A. Williams &
Margaret Y.K. Woo, The "Worthy Unemployed".• Societal Stratification and
Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 464-77 (1993).
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prosperous and economically advanced urban enclave facing
absorption by a still poor and largely rural giant next door.
While Hong Kong's per capita income has come to rival that of
the industrialized West and Japan, China's remains among the
lowest in the world. Typically described as a "newly industrializ-
ing country" in the 1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong has begun to
move rapidly toward a post-industrial stage, with its local and
multinational companies shifting their manufacturing operations
beyond the colony's boundaries (largely to Guangdong), and
sophisticated service industries now generating a large share of the
territory's economic activity (and agriculture virtually none).16
China's economy, while showing robust growth in commercial,
financial, and other services, remains dominated by a shrinking,
but still large, agrarian sector and a growing industrial one that is
characterized by an unusual combination of small and scattered
new enterprises and relatively unreformed state-owned behemoths
held over from an earlier era."' Reflecting differences in size as
well as in levels of economic development, China's economy also
remains far less deeply integrated with the global economy (and
thus under less pressure to play by its rules) than Hong Kong's is.
Significant legal and institutional consequences follow from
such economic facts, principally that the P.R.C. lacks much of
what Western-trained business people, lawyers, and government
administrators would find familiar in Hong Kong's formal
structures and actual practices. Hong Kong prides itself - and
sells itself - on its provision of a "rule of law" regime for business
and commerce that is the equal or near-equal of any in the world
in the transparency of its rules, the neutrality of its courts, the
availability of high quality legal advice and representation, and the
clarity and completeness of its framework of substantive laws in
the shadow of which parties can bargain and assess accurately their
prospects for effective legal remedy in the event of non-perfor-
mance.
Complementing this private law regime is a public law system
that most agree does a good job of checking civil service corrup-
16 See generally Tang Shu-hung, The Economy, in FROM COLONY TO SAR:
HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 117-150 (Joseph S.Y. Cheng & Sonny H.
Lo eds., 1995); Gene Linn, Manufactu rers Promised Modest Revival of Past Glory,
J. COMMERCE, Jan. 30, 1997, at 6A.
17 See, e.g., NAUGHTON, supra note 13, at 330-33; Barry Naughton, China's
Macroeconomy in Transition, 144 CHINA Q. 1083 (1995).
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tion, providing for judicial review of government action, and
imposing few regulatory burdens on business. As Hong Kong's
boosters hasten to point out, such virtues have made the territory
a forum of choice for many complex international transactions
that could be undertaken elsewhere, and the hub of the sprawling
regional or global operations of truly international corporations
that could be located almost anywhere."
Unlike Hong Kong, but typical of developing countries, China
provides a legal regime for economic actors that remains character-
ized by, at best, highly uncertain prospects for judicial or other
formal enforcement of agreements, a problem that compounds the
difficulty created by generally poor information about potential
economic partners. Accordingly, a large proportion of business
agreements in the still (relatively) undeveloped and newly volatile
Chinese economy continue to involve discrete transactions capable
of simultaneous performance. Alternatively, longer term arrange-
ments are often restricted to narrow networks in which informal
sanctions operate and more reliable indicia of a party's willingness
and ability to perform are available.19 Thus, there is something
less than may meet the eye - and much less than one finds in
contemporary Hong Kong - in China's recently established
contract laws and other economic laws. Although containing
much that foreign capitalists find familiar (and some "state
interest"-protecting provisions that still give pause), those laws
remain shallowly rooted and cast only modest or distorted
18 See generally MINERS, supra note 8, at 95-97 (discussing the Independent
Commission Against Corruption); PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 226-312 (1994) (discussing judicial
oversight of government activity); Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Cooking
the Rice Without Cooking the Goose: The Rule of Law, the Battle over Business,
and the Quest for Prosperity in Hong Kong After 1997, in HONG KONG UNDER
CHINESE RULE: THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
REVERSION (Warren I. Cohen & Li Zhao eds., forthcoming 1997); Y.C. Jao,
Hong Kong's Future as a Free Market Economy, in HONG KONG: A CHINESE
AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN 205, 205-08 (furgen Domes & Yu-ming Shaw
eds., 1988) (stressing links between "laissez-faire," rAle of law, and Hong Kong's
local and global economic success); Fumio Sumiya, Hong Kong, Singapore
Outpace Tokyo as Financial Centers, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 18, 1995, at 2
(attributing Hong Kong's growth relative to Tokyo as global financial center
to the former's less "regulation-bound" market).
19 See, e.g., DOROTHY SOLINGER, CHINA'S TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM:
STATIST LEGACIES AND MARKET REFORMS, 1980-1990 107-22 (1993); Lucie
Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143,
21541 (1991).
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shadows on economic actors' dealings. 20
The same can be said about formally upgraded and vastly
expanded economic courts that often lack the will and capacity to
make and enforce independent judgments that follow the laws'
apparent dictates. Reports are legion of courts requiring
recalcitrant parties to settle, or judicial tribunals "consulting" local
party and government officials. Even the rare occasions when
cases do reach a final judgment, and parties secure nominal
victories, that still fails to provide effective relief, especially against
remote or powerful opposing parties.21
The more obviously regulatory or public law face of China's
economic law provides a similar study in contrast to Hong
Kong's. Whether classified as "state-owned" (guoying), "collective"
(jit), or "private" (siying), and regardless of whether they have
assumed corporate (gongsz) form, enterprises continue to operate
in a legal framework that takes as its premise: that which is not
specifically authorized, by law or by license, is forbidden. For
substantial enterprises, business licenses typically permit only a
narrow scope of operation, and statutes mandate close monitoring
by supervisory government departments. 2  Taxation rates and
other legal rules that are formally of general application fall prey
to case-by-case bargaining and exertions of informal power and
influence.2
The same perspective on regulation - and the fertile ground
20 For an example of a "state interest" provision, see Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Jingji Hetong Fa [Economic Contract Law of the P.R.C.] art. 7(4)
(1981, amended 1993) (stating that contracts "in violation of State or public
interests" are "invalid"). On the implementation, and limits to implementation,
of contract law and contract law norms, see generally David Zweig et al., Law,
Contracts and Economic Modernization: Lessons from the Recent Chinese Rural
Reforms, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319 (1987).
21 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of Civil Judgments in China,
141 CHINA Q. 65 (1995); Zweig et al., supra note 20, at 361-63.
' See, e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General
Principles of Civil Law of the P.R.C.] arts. 42, 49 (1986); Gongsi Fa, supra note
13, arts. 30, 67, 124-28; Qiye Fa, supra note 13, arts. 17(vi), 55.
2 See generally David M. Lampton, A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining
Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics in China, in BUREAUCRACY, PoLITIcs AND
DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 33 (David M. Lampton & Kenneth
Lieberthal eds., 1992); David Bachman, Implementing Chinese Tax Policy, in
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAo CHINA 119 David M. Lampton ed.,
1987). Onprogress in making taxation less subject to ad hoc bargaining, see
Tsang Shu-ki & Cheng Yuk-shing, China's Tax Reforms of 1994, 34 ASIAN
SuRv. 769 (1994).
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that it creates for unpredictable and sometimes corrupt exercises
of discretion in allocating state-rationed opportunities - extends
to international trade and investment relations. There, too, a web
of laws and regulations requires official approvals or licenses
before a foreign-invested enterprise can be established or a Chinese
company can seek capital or sell goods abroad. Laws and policies
also set limits on the volume of such authorizations, and impose
a bewildering array of conditions on granting them. Moreover,
despite a commitment during the last several years to "transparen-
cy" (tongmingdu), complaints have persisted that some of the rules
relating to foreign investment have been treated as "internal"
(neibu), not for circulation to those affected by them.2 4
The Guangzhou-Shenzhen region, as well as Shanghai and
other booming urban areas in the P.R.C., have begun to close the
still-wide economic gap with Hong Kong. Yet, as much social
scientific theory predicts and as numerous anecdotal accounts
suggest, legal and broader institutional change in China has lagged
considerably behind the pace of economic transformation.
Interpreted as residual Leninism or as political decay, the trend in
China is not one that suggests convergence with Hong Kong's
regime of minimal but generally effective and non-corrupt
institutions and rules for regulating the economy 2  Whatever
the economic pressures for China to change in that direction, they
remain somewhat blunted and diluted by forces to which China's
24 For general discussions of these issues, see Timothy A. Gelatt, Legal and
Extra-legal Issues in Joint Venture Negotiations, 1 J. CHINESE L. 217 (1987);
Pittman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China:
Dilemmas of State Control, 141 CHINA Q. 155 (1995); Bing Wang, China's New
Foreign Trade Law: Analysis and Implications for China's GATT Bid, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 495 (1995); see also Lori Ioannou, The Last 400 Days, INT'L
BUS., May 1996, at 50-53 (noting the American Chamber of Commerce in
Hong Kong president's criticism of lack of transparency).
25 See generally JAMES A. BILL & ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR., COMPARA-
TIVE POLITICS 66-83 (1981) (reviewing theories of "modernization" and
"political development"); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SOCIETIEs (1968) (concerning the gap between economic change
and political institutional capacity to respond to and manage its consequences);
BARRETT L. MCCORMICK, POLITICAL REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA:
DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN A LENINIST STATE (1990) (describing the
P.R.C. as a still-Leninist system, although one in crisis); Andrew G. Walder,
The Quiet Revolution from Within: Economic Reform as a Source of Political
Decline, in THE WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS
OF POLITICAL DECLINE IN CHINA AND HUNGARY 1 (Andrew G. Walder ed.,
1995) (pursuing the "decay" thesis).
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economically advanced coastal regions remain politically vulnera-
ble, despite their substantial de jure and greater defacto autonomy.
Over a wide range of national legal rules, institutional structures,
policy agendas and political habits, the needs, preferences, and
interests of China's less developed inland provinces and its
economically uncompetitive industries remain major consider-
ations that weigh against the demands and desires of the P.R.C.'s
more "Hong Kong-like" regions and sectors2 6 In addition,
implementing policies to reform and rebuild institutions would
face a formidable uphill battle in state and party organs stocked
with cadres for whom China's booming economy and crumbling
ideology have meant new opportunities to use their powers of
office and their access to "inside" information and political favors
to advance their own fortunes or those of their friends and family.
2.2. Politics and Ideology. Fundamental Diferences
Describing Hong Kong as a "first-world city" about to be
taken over by a "third-world country," a senior Hong Kong
official sought both to sum up the relatively non-ideological aspect
of the divide stemming from economic contrasts, and also to
evoke the non-economic dimension of the ideological gulf - and
related differences in legal and constitutional orders - that
separates the territory and its post-1997 sovereign.?' On this
political front, the fault lines between systems run not so much
between developed and developing or between capitalist and
socialist, but, rather, between evolving liberal-democratic on one
side and vestigially Marxist-Leninist and corruptly authoritarian
on the other.
Colonial Hong Kong's laws and government structures have
hardly been models of liberal-democratic ideals. The colonial
governor, wielding broad executive and legislative power, has
26 See generally KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM
REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 265-67 (1995); NAUGHTON, supra note 13,
at 184-86; Shirk, The Politics of Industrial Reform, supra note 15; Irene So, SEZ
in Push for Foreign Capital, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 1995, at 8
(describing criticisms of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone for "monopolising
economic privileges," and reporting Shenzhen vice-mayor's defense of S.E.Z.s'
contributions). The Ninth Five Year Plan (currently in effect) commits the
state to foster more rapid development of the inland areas that have lagged far
behind coastal provinces in China's reform-era boom.
27 Interview with Anonymous Senior Hong Kong Government Official, in
Hong Kong (July, 1996).
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always been appointed from London, without local input from
Hong Kong. A Legislative Council ("Legco"), limited to largely
consultative functions and veto powers over some purely local
laws, had been selected exclusively by gubernatorial appointment
until recent years. The legislative powers of Hong Kong's
colonial government as a whole have been modest as well, defined
and limited by British laws that are beyond Hong Kong's ability
to alter. In the waning days of British rule, Hong Kong's laws
still permitted considerable press censorship, administrative
detention, suppression of political organizations, and tight
restrictions on political rallies. In addition, the colonial govern-
ment's record of staying within those modest legal limits was not
spotless. Moreover, and more diffusely, much of the real political
power in the colony was exercised informally by or on behalf of
economic elites.28
Nonetheless, especially in recent years, there has been much
that proponents of liberal and democratic ideologies could find
appealing in Hong Kong. In the wake of the Beijing regime's
violent suppression of the 1989 Democracy Movement on the
mainland, the Hong Kong government adopted a Bill of Rights
Ordinance embracing basic civil and political liberties, mandating
rights-protecting rules of statutory construction, and prompting
amendment or judicial invalidation of existing legislation to bring
Hong Kong's laws in line with liberal standards, including those
set forth in the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political
Rights.29 Popular elections, introduced for local urban council
and district council posts in the 1970s, became contested, multi-
party affairs and reached up to the Legco level in the 1990s, with
fully two-thirds or more of the sixty seats in the Legco elected in
1995 being filled - directly or indirectly - on the basis of a
2 On these issues, see generally, MINERS, supra note 8, at 53-84, 114-27;
IAN SCOTT, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGrrIMACY IN HONG
KONG 59-60, 24849 (1987); WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 18, at 23-50, 108-25, 171-
213; Ming K. Chan, The Imperfect Legacy: Defects in the British Legal System in
Colonial Hong Kong, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 133 (1997); Nihal
Jayawickrama, Protecting Civil Liberties, in THE FUTURE OF THE LAW IN
HONG KONG 148 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989).
29 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinance, chap. 383
(1991); Societies Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, chap. 151 (amended 1992);
Public Order Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, chap. 245 (amended 1995).
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broad suffrage."0
Moreover, Legco's role and visibility in the colony's govern-
ment increased, especially during the 1990s when Governor
Christopher Patten submitted for its consideration key bills on
electoral reform and the establishment of a Court of Final Appeal.
The profile-raising effect for Legco proved greater still when both
of these bills prompted contentious debate, and the expression of
considerable opposition to the government's positions from across
the spectrum of democrats, independents, business conservatives,
and pro-China members.
Apart from the recent and still-limited democratization and
augmented critical roles of Hong Kong's quasi-legislative organ, a
variety of institutions have long provided a considerable degree of
government accountability and limits to abuses of governmental
power. These principally include the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (established in 1975), the "pre-reform" Legco
itself, and a judiciary empowered to hear challenges to govern-
ment actions, imbued with a strong sense of independence, and
ultimately subject to review by the Privy Council in London -
a body subject to no direct or significant influence from the
colonial government. In recent years, some of the territory's
emergent cadre of liberal and pro-democracy politicians have
argued that Britain's Parliament has provided a modest sort of
vicarious democracy for Hong Kong, assuring that popularly
elected representatives (albeit ones in London and not chosen by
a Hong Kong electorate) oversee and call to account the appointed
officials charged with administering Hong Kong's affairs. 1
In these areas, the People's Republic remains, in theory and
practice, a profoundly different system. Much has changed since
the era of Mao Zedong. The 1982 state constitution declares the
Chinese Communist Party to be subject to the law, and provides
a laundry list of liberal civil and political rights for citizens.32
ID Legislative Council (Electoral Provisions) Ordinance, Hong Kong
Ordinances, chap. 381 (1995). For more detailed descriptions of the Patten
reforms, see MINERS, supra note 8, at 116, 128a; Lo Chi-kin, From Through
Train to Second Stove, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENG-
ES AHEAD, supra note 16, at 25, 28.
31 For a discussion on the latter point, see Martin Lee, Need for "Rule of
Law", S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at 11.
32 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the P.R.C.] arts.
5, 33-50 [hereinafter Xianfa].
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Genuinely contested direct elections have been held at the village
level in some areas at some times. At more elite levels, nominally
democratic organs have rejected a handful of the most unpopular
second-tier members of powerful factions in the leadership as
candidates for membership in key Party and state organs.33 The
Administrative Litigation Law has afforded citizens an unprece-
dented and sometimes fruitful avenue for challenging in court
instances of overreaching and abuse by state actors. Some
prominent officials and their relatives have faced prosecution for
corruption. And the Party's and the government's internal
disciplinary proceedings have offered a significant means for
bringing some errant party and state functionaries to heel.34
Still, China's political and constitutional order remains
officially Leninist, strongly authoritarian, and, accordingly, short
on citizen-initiated remedies against state and quasi-state actors.
The state constitution and Party ideology enshrine the leadership
of the Communist Party, the socialist road, Marxism-Leninism
Mao Zedong Thought, and the People's democratic dictatorship
as "basic principles" (jiben yuanze). The constitution also makes
citizens' enjoyment of its individual rights provisions subordinate
to the interests of the state and contingent on citizens' perfor-
mance of a rather extensive set of constitutionally imposed
3' See, e.g., Yan Jiaqi, The Nature of Chinese Authoritarianism, in DECISION-
MAKING IN DENG'S CHINA 3, 10 (Carol Lee Hamrin & Suisheng Zhao eds.,
1995); RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
DENG XIAOPING 215-18, 364 (1994) (concerning more elite level developments);
ANDREw J. NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 193-232 (1985) (concerning local
elections of 1980); Trudy Rubin, A Sign That China's Long March to Democracy
May Have Begun, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 12, 1997, at F2 (discussing more
recent local elections).
"' See generally Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa
[Administrative Litigation Law of the P.R.C.] (1989); HSI-SHENG CH'I,
POLITICS OF DISILLUSIONMENT 17-225 (1991) (describing intra-Party "rectifica-
tion campaigns" of the 1980s); Alison E.W. Connor, Anticorruption Legislation,
11 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 8 (an. 15, 1989); Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg
Against a Stone? Administrative Litigation in the P.R.C, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1
(1989); Beijing Mayor Pledges Result in Chen Xitong Case, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 23, 1996 (describing the corruption scandal leading to fall of
Beijing Party chief, the suicide of the deputy mayor, and the new anti-
corruption drive); China Iron and Steel Boss Quits, Son Arrested on Corruption
Charges, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 18, 1995 (describing the bribery scandal
at Shougang, a huge and "model" state enterprise, and the arrest, leading to
conviction and a suspended death sentence, for son of company chairman).
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duties.35 By all unofficial accounts (and some official ones),
socialist democracy and enjoyment of liberal-sounding rights in
practice fall short of what the constitution appears to promise.36
Little in the way of popular control or meaningful accountability
flows from nominally representative legislatures, the presence of
alternative political parties, formal procedures for electing
legislative and executive officials, or administrative law's narrowly
cabined promise of judicial redress (one that does not permit
challenges to the Party's actions, to the validity of underlying
regulations or statutes that formally authorize concrete state
actions, or to concrete actions formally authorized by invalid
regulations and statutes). 3Y
The most potent mechanisms for holding power-holders
accountable, and providing citizens with redress or vindicating
their rights, remain remarkably informal, ad hoc, and ultimately
dependent on the discretionary action of those who wield power
within Party-dominated structures. Hope for a remedy often
depends on journalistic exposes that attract the leadership's
attention, or periodic Party-led campaigns that are extra-legal in
form and, arguably, anti-legal in spirit. Relief often requires
intervention by powerful individuals who sometimes hold
formally important positions in the Party and state hierarchies,
and who act to enforce official norms (albeit somewhat selectively
against political opponents or rival factions).3' As this suggests,
3 See Xianfa, supra note 32, pmbl., arts. 33, 51-54; Deng Xiaoping, Uphold
the Four Cardinal Principles, in SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 166-91
(1984).
36 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CONTINUED PATTERNS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CHNA (1992); United States Dept. of State,
Human Rights Country Reports: China (1996) (on file with author). But see
Guowuyuan Xinwen Zhu, Zhongguo de Renquan Zhuangkuang [State Council
Information Office, "White Paper" on Human Rights in China] (1991); Zhu
Muzhi Addresses Human Rights, BEIJING REv., Feb. 17-Mar. 2, 1997, at 11.
" On the formal limitations of the Administrative Litigation Law, see
Pittman B. Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the P.R.C.: Judicial
Review and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAo
CHINA 270 (Pittman B. Potter ed., 1994).
3' See supra note 34; CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC CONFLICTS 101-106 (Lawrence R. Sullivan ed., 1995) (concerning
anti-corruption campaigns); LIu BINYAN, PEOPLE OR MONSTERS? (1983)
(providing examples of reportage); MCCORMICK, supra note 25, at 104-13, 157-
90 (concerning anti-crime campaigns and "rectification" drives inside the Party);
POLICY CONFLICTS IN POST-MAO CHINA 102-14 (John P. Burns & Stanley
Rosen eds., 1986) (concerning "letters and visits" method of citizen-initiated
1997]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
the persisting weakness or worsening decay of formal institutions
and procedures in China's authoritarian politics and government
has made corruption - in the broad sense of departing from or
adhering to official norms for illegitimate reasons, and in the
narrow sense of influence-peddling - both a key means, and a
major impediment, to achieving compliance with the demands of
law and official policy. And, more broadly, the making of law
and policy has remained profoundly influenced by informal
processes, networks, and sources of power that only loosely track,
and frequently cut across, legal and constitutional structures.
2.3. Legal Systems. Diferent "Types"
Finally, the legal systems of Hong Kong and the P.R.C. stand
on opposite sides of a basic divide as well, one that is only
partially attributable to differences in economic and political
institutions, ideologies, or levels of economic development.
Typologically, the P.R.C. is a member of the civil law family, an
indirect heir to a Franco-German tradition received into China via
Japan and the Soviet Union. In contrast, Hong Kong is part of
the common law world, rooted in England and having spread
throughout much of the former British empire. To be sure, the
dichotomy between the two types of legal systems is vulnerable
to oversimplification and, hence, to overstatement. The civil law
system is too easily and too often described as one in which the
decision of cases (and a minimal judicial articulation of legal rules)
turns on exegeses of code texts undertaken by a judiciary rather
similar in structure and ethos to other government bureaucracies.
The common law system is too facilely contrasted as one in which
judge-made law and diffuse extra-legislative norms dominate, and
the process of adjudication (most strikingly in cases involving the
review of legislative and other governmental action) is the
province of highly "independent" or even "unaccountable" courts
that are, in spirit and sometimes in formal powers, a sharply
distinct "third branch."
39
Nonetheless, the conventional dichotomy between common
law and civil law does point to some salient differences between
investigation of official misconduct).
3" For a general discussion of the contrasts between the two systems, see
the materials collected in ComPARIE LEGALTRADIT ONS 65-129, 455-537
(Mary Ann Glendon et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
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the variants of the two great legal families that have developed -
amid considerable differences in economic and political systems -
on opposite sides of the P.R.C.-Hong Kong border. Two
controversies of the transitional period illustrate the point.
First, some Hong Kong lawyers and pro-democracy politicians
- most notably Legco member, Democratic Party leader, and
prominent barrister Martin Lee4° - have voiced the fear that
China will force an expansion of Hong Kong's "act of state"
doctrine to insulate many tortious or commercial actions of
Chinese state-owned enterprises and government actions from
review and redress in S.A.R. courts.41 The territory's politically
engaged lawyers and legally aware politicians generally agree that
the existing judge-made "act of state" and related doctrines, which
preclude judicial review of questions involving such quintessential
sovereign acts as the exercise of powers committed to the
discretion of a political branch by the constitution or by legisla-
tion (as well as matters involving the exercise of core foreign
affairs functions), constitute a well-articulated and fairly narrow
principle in the common law system to which Hong Kong
subscribes. They see the present doctrine as posing no dire threat
to the courts' role in preserving principles of government under
law.42 What the more vocally skeptical among their number fear
is that a much broader definition will be read into the relevant
text of the Basic Law (the S.A.R.'s mini-constitution enacted by
the P.R.C.'s National People's Congress ("NPC")) and the Court
of Final Appeal Ordinance (a 1995 local Hong Kong law that
belatedly - and controversially - implemented a Sino-British deal
first struck in 1991). Both of these laws provide, in language that
critics see as ominously ambiguous, that S.A.R. courts shall have
no jurisdiction over "acts of state such as foreign affairs and
' Martin Lee is the Chairman of the Democratic Party and one of the
most outspoken advocates for democracy in Hong Kong. On the "act of state"
question, Lee has disagreed with many of his usual political allies, who have
taken a more sanguine view.
41 See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Future Imperfect, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Aug.
10, 1995, at 27 (citing views of Martin Lee and legal academic Raymond
Wacks); Clauses Raise Worries on Humnan Rights After '97, S. CHNA MORNiNG
POST, July 27, 1995, at 5.
4 Interviews with Anonymous Hong Kong Barristers and Government
Lawyers, in Hong Kong (fuly, 1996); see generall WESLEY-SMITH, supra note
18, at 91-92 (concerning "act of state" doctrines applicable in colonial Hong
Kong law).
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defense" (guofang; waijiao deng guojia xingwe). 43
While the issue of how broadly to insulate the Chinese state
and its instrumentalities from review in Hong Kong's courts is in
large part one of presumed political differences over the desirable
extent of government accountability, the civil law-common law
divide matters as well. Those in Hong Kong who openly worry
about an expansion of the act of state doctrine assume that a
P.R.C.-style civil law approach will be pursued to serve the
Beijing authorities' substantive ends: China will insist upon, or
undertake directly, an interpretation - perhaps a legislative one
- of the vague statutory clause. This formally unobjectionable
civil law process, China will presumably claim, is free legitimately
to ignore established common law doctrine, as well as the
underlying common law conventions supporting judicial authority
to hear cases and provide redress against the government and the
entities it owns or controls. Those in Hong Kong who favor the
current doctrine, but say they do not see very much cause for
alarm in the statutory provisions, argue or assume that common
law doctrine - and the broader notion of courts' roles that
support that doctrine - will be allowed to carry forward
relatively unscathed, as promised in the Joint Declaration. 44
Second, and more broadly, a long-running controversy over
the prospects for the "independent judicial power" (duli de
sifaquan) promised as part of the S.A.R.'s "high degree of
autonomy" (gaodu zizhi) has had a similar structure.45 Much of
the concern that critics and skeptics express derives from a sense
that, as a matter of substantive political ideology and institutional
" Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 19 (emphasis added); Court of Final Appeal
Ordinance, Hong Kong Ordinances, chap. 484; Court of Final Appeal: The Text
in Full, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 1995, at 2 (providing the text of
the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group Agreement on C.F.A.); cf. Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 1, annex I, § I (stating that "foreign and defense affairs are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government" and thus not within the
"executive, legislative and independent judicial power" of the S.A.R.).
" For examples of both sorts of arguments - that the Court Ordinance
invites arbitrary interpretation by the NPC Standing Committee and thus
invites a step-by-step erosion of the rule of law through legislative interpreta-
tion, and, on the other side, that the pledge to preserve the common law
adequately insures continuation of a narrow act of state doctrine - see Clauses
Raise Worries on Human Rights, supra note 41, at 5; Robin Fitzsimons, Is Hong
Kong Facing a Legal Sell-Out?, TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 1995.
" Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 2, 19; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, paras.
3(2), 3(3).
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practice, China is weakly committed to the rule of law in any
form or to accepting "genuine" or "meaningful" autonomy for the
S.A.R. in any sphere. But their fears are also compounded by the
P.R.C.-Hong Kong version of the split between civil law and
common law systems. On this view, part of the danger stems
from China's embrace of a legal-structural principle of legislative
supremacy (assumedly for reasons with obvious appeal to Leninists
and authoritarians where, as in China, the top leadership's ability
to control law-makers is secure). Chinese legal theory in general
provides for courts' formal subordination to the legislature and
mandates their obedience to legislative interpretations of laws.
The Basic Law extends this approach to the Hong Kong S.A.R.,
specifically granting the NPC's Standing Committee ultimate
power to "interpret" (jieshi) the Basic Law (in consultation with
its Basic Law Committee), and preserving the NPC's authority to
"amend" (xiugai) the Basic Law.4
Although orthodox (if not strictly necessary) in a civil law
system, the structural doctrine of legislative supremacy, especially
in China's formulation, seems to be in serious tension with Hong
Kong's particular common law tradition of an independent
judiciary. Indeed, Hong Kong's tradition of strong judicial
independence, combined with the lack of accountability of the
highest court for the territory (the Privy Council in London) to
any Hong Kong governmental body, arguably approach the U.S.
model more nearly than does the U.K.'s system of parliamentary
supremacy checked by unwritten constitutional principles.
2.4. The Institutional Solution
Through years of negotiation and conflict, China, Britain and
a variety of forces in Hong Kong have crafted an unusually
extensive structure for bringing these seemingly antithetical
economic, political, and legal systems within the legal and
institutional structure of a single sovereign state. The Joint
Declaration, the Basic Law, and several supplementary laws,
policies, and agreements collectively sketch - to the partial
satisfaction of some and the alarm of others - a framework
pledging integration without radical transformation. They
provide that Hong Kong is to exercise a high degree of legislative
. 46 Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 158, 159; Xianfa, supra note 32, arts. 62, 67,
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autonomy through a S.A.R. legislature that was once to be
composed of representatives riding a "through train" from
membership in the last colonial Legco, that is now initially to be
a "Provisional Legislature" stocked by legislators named by a
P.R.C.-chosen Selection Committee, and that in later iterations is
to be elected, ultimately by universal suffrage.47
Similarly, the executive power accorded to the S.A.R. is to be
wielded by an administration staffed by a local civil service, and
headed by a P.R.C.-appointed Chief Executive, with the first
occupant of that office (already) nominated by the same commit-
tee that has more recently selected the Provisional Legislature, and
later incumbents selected by democratic elections.4 The arrange-
ments for the legal system promise that the "laws in force in
Hong Kong" and various United Nations-recognized human rights
principles will remain in force, that the territory's common law
system will persist, and that an independent judiciary, appointed
by the Chief Executive and headed by a collegial Court of Final
Appeal (potentially with one expatriate member from another
common law jurisdiction), will interpret those laws and exercise
the S.A.R.'s "high degree of judicial autonomy."49
The same bundle of international agreements, national and
local laws, and less formal arrangements also mandates limits to
autonomy and demands a considerable degree of integration. For
example, the S.A.R. is declared to be non-derogably part of a
unitary Chinese state. Further, its autonomous powers and local
laws are limited by their dependence on the NPC's affirmative
delegation of law-making authority, their vulnerability to reversal
by NPC action (either legislative or interpretive), and the
affirmative obligation of the S.A.R. legislature to enact several
laws mandated by the Basic Law. Moreover, the Chief Executive
is appointed formally (and in practice, if the selection of the
47 Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 2, 66-79, Annex HI; joint Declaration, sup ra
note 1, paras. 3 (2), 3 (3), annex I, § 11, Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu
Xiangang Tebie Xingzheng Qu Diyi Ju Zhengfu he Lifahui Chansheng Banfa
de Jueding [Decision of the NPC on the Method for the Formation of the First
Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong S.A.R.] (1990)
[hereinafter NPC Decision].
48 Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 43-65, annex I; Joint Declaration, supra
note 1, para. 3(4), annex I, § I; NPC Decision, supra note 47.
11 Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 2, 8, 39, 80-96; Joint Declaration, supra
note 1, paras. 3(3), 34, annex I, % II, III, XIII; Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra
note 29; Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, supra note 43.
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office's first occupant is indicative) by Beijing, and remains legally
"accountable" to the Central People's Government. Additionally,
the power to interpret and amend the Basic Law is vested in the
NPC and its Standing Committee. Finally, matters requiring
interpretation of provisions governing the relationship between
the S.A.R. and the Central People's Government are, like acts of
state, explicitly beyond the independent powers of S.A.R.
courts. 50
Whether this ambitious and elaborate, yet ambivalent and
ambiguous, package of legal and institutional measures will work
to accommodate the two systems' striking differences - whether
it will provide a mechanism for effecting a transformation from
colony to S.A.R. that is compatible with the Chinese leadership's
interpretation of the requirements of sovereignty and that also
delivers on the promises of continuity and autonomy that people
indispensable to Hong Kong's continuing success require - is a
question the answer to which may lie in what happens during the
period of final, formal transition.
On one hand, no certain and widely convincing answer
appears possible before the date of the handover. That much is
evident from the heated and polarized debates about the bleakness
or brightness of the territory's future that have persisted up to the
eve of formal reversion and well after the formal legal and
institutional arrangements for the S.A.R. have been laid down.
Thus, for example, the colonial government has insisted that the
1995 Court of Final Appeal Law adequately preserves the rule of
law that has made Hong Kong special. Numerous voices from the
business community express unbridled confidence in the terri-
tory's future under S.A.R. institutions and point to Hong Kong's
continued robust economic health as support for their sanguine
views. At the same time, the Hong Kong government's erstwhile
allies in the late colonial democratization process have denounced
the deal on the court as an irredeemable betrayal of the rule of
law, and point to the flight of some of Hong Kong's most
50 See Basic Law, supra note 4, pmbl, art. 1 (concerning sovereignty, arts.
2, 17, 18, 23, 39 (concerning S.A.R. legislative authority and obligations), arts.
15, 43 (concerning Chief Executive), arts. 158, 159 (concerning interpretation
and amendment), arts. 19, 158 (concerning judicial authority); Joint Declaration,
supra note 1, para. 1; NPC Decision, supra note 47 (concerning Chief
Executive); Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, supra note 43 (concerning judicial
authority).
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venerable companies to seek listings in the Cayman Islands,
Bermuda, or Singapore as evidence of the legislation's inadequa-
cy. 51
On the other hand, and notwithstanding confident assertions
- both pessimistic and optimistic - that the die has already been
cast and the outcome is foreseeable, a palpable air of anticipation
still surrounds July 1, 1997, even for partisans who claim a high
degree of prescience.52 That mood is surely rooted in a broad
sense that the real test of the legal, institutional, and constitutional
arrangements that have emerged from more than a decade of
multilateral bargaining and conflict will not come until after Hong
Kong's colonial authorities depart. The plausible assumption is
that, faced with the force of events and the inescapable demands
of making concrete decisions concerning politics, law, and
governance for the territory, those ruling post-reversion Hong
Kong will have to reveal what the formally prescribed norms,
rules, and structures of the S.A.R. will mean in practice, and they
will have to do so in the immediate wake of the handback.
On this view, then, a relatively brief period of Central
People's Government-S.A.R. interaction, and S.A.R. practice,
following the handover will tell us a great deal about whether the
vital alchemical formula for "one country, two systems" will
likely yield an unprecedented and impressive synthesis, a base
metal, or perhaps even a catastrophic explosion. From a perspec-
tive that thus focuses on apparent antinomies between the
established ways of the territory and those of its future master,
and sees the proffered institutional fixes as a principal - if
possibly inadequate - mechanism for resolving them, July 1,
1997, does promise to be something much more than a time of
only formal and symbolic transformation, or a mere milepost in
a protracted transition.
S See generally on this debate, deLisle & Lane, supra note 18; William
Dowell, Hong Kong 1997, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (1997) (taking a more
pessimistic position); Anthony Neoh, Financial Legal Institutions in Hong
Kong's Transition, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 31 (1997) (siding with more
optimistic views).
12 One rough indicator of this level of anticipation is the flood of articles
and editorials in the Hong Kong press that seek to predict or explain Hong
Kong's post-1997 future. In an index of the territory's major dailies, entries
under the heading "the question of the future" (qiantu wentz) run to the
thousands. See Xiangang Baozhi Jianbao Mulu (Index of Clippings from Hong
Kong Newspapers) (on file with author).
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3. THE LONG TRANSITION: CONVERGENCE, INTEGRATION,
AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF NEW INSTITUTIONS
From a perspective that focuses on less starkly contrasting
aspects of eve-of-reversion Hong Kong and China, and that sees
less riding on the implementation of formal legal and institutional
arrangements for the S.A.R., July 1, 1997, appears likely to be a
date of relatively modest significance in the colony's reintegration
with the motherland, one not warranting the attention that will
surely mark its arrival. On this view, the nominal transfer of
authority is but one moment in a long transition that began two
decades ago, that will require less change than many imagine, and
that can be expected to continue well beyond the turn of the
century.
In many aspects of Hong Kong's economic, political, and legal
life, 1997 is already here, and has been for some time. In other
respects, we likely will not know what 1997 means for Hong
Kong for a decade or more.
3.1. Economics: Integration and Similarity
For much of its time as a British colony, Hong Kong has been
economically dependent on the mainland as its indispensable
source of water, food, electricity, and (in the form of migrants and
refugees) labor power. With the creation of the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone on Hong Kong's border and the P.R.C.'s broader
post-Mao embrace of policies to welcome foreign capital and to
expand China's engagement in international commerce, Hong
Kong's economic relationship with its neighbor began to undergo
major transformation even before the commencement in 1982 of
the Sino-British negotiations that ultimately produced the Joint
Declaration. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hong Kong has
been the single largest source of, and platform for, the burgeoning
flows of foreign investment to the People's Republic and especial-
ly to Guangdong, the province neighboring Hong Kong. By most
estimates, Hong Kong accounts for over half of foreign direct
investment in the P.R.C. today. Hong Kong companies, often
ones quite modest in size, have been the foreign partners in the
lion's share of joint-ventures and other foreign-invested enterpris-
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es.' In the 1990s, major mainland companies began to be listed
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (in the so-called "H-share"
market, which supplemented the domestically issued "A-shares"
and "B-shares" and, for a few select state-owned companies, "N-
shares" sold, respectively, to P.R.C. citizens, foreigners -
including Hong Kong "compatriots" - in China, and investors on
the New York Stock Exchange). 4
The pattern in foreign trade has been similar. More than half
of China's imports and exports go through Hong Kong. Much of
this trade is in the form of re-exports to China from other
countries or from other countries to China, making Hong Kong
China's vital gateway to the world. On its own account, Hong
Kong consistently ranks among the P.R.C.'s top two or three
trading partners.5"
Such developments have meant a striking reconfiguration of
Hong Kong's economic identity, bringing a rapid integration of
the colony's economy with China's, and especially southeastern
coastal China's, economy. By some estimates, as much as one-
third of the territory's GDP is now attributable to "the China
factor. "56
As this suggests, the reform era P.R.C. has become a principal
venue for Hong Kong-based investment as well. Many of Hong
Kong's manufacturing concerns have become transborder
" See, e.g., Hong Kong Government Trade Department, China and Hong
Kong: Some Important Facts (visited Mar. 31, 1997) < http//www.info.gov.hk >;
People's Republic of China: February 1997, QUEST ECON. DATA BASE, NAT'L
WESTMINSTER COUNTRY BRIEFS (1997); Bryan Batson, People, Politics and
Profits, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 3841; Ioannou, supra note 24, at
50; Kathleen Kearney, Deng's Open Door Policy Led HK into China, Reuters,
Feb. 21, 1997; Confidence in 1997 Handover Rising in HK, Xinhua News
Agency, Dec. 30, 1996; see also Yin-wing Sung, Economic Integration of Hong
Kong and Guangdong in the 1990s, in PASSAGE TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY: A
HONG KONG READER 182 (Ming.K. Chan & Gerald Postiglione eds., 1996).
On earlier periods, see A. G. YOUNGSON, CHINA-HONG KONG: THE
ECONOMIC NEXUS (1983).
s For general accounts of this system, see Robert Art & Minkang Gu,
China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the P.R.C., 20 YALE J. INT'L
L. 273, 300-05 (1995); Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing
Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA
PACIFIC BASIN L. REV. 62, 85-96 (1993).
51 See, e.g., Tang, The Economy, supra note 16, at 133-34; NATIONAL
WESTMINSTER COUNTRY BRIEFS, supra note 53; Sarah Davidson, Hong Kong
Trade Gap Widens as Exports Plunge, Reuters, July 26, 1996.
51 See Tang, The Economy, supra note 16, at 133.
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enterprises with front offices in the territory and factories in
Guangdong, thus exploiting newly available opportunities to
specialize along obvious lines of comparative advantage. Some
of Hong Kong's most prominent tycoons and their companies
have made infrastructure construction, property development and
other ventures in the P.R.C. a substantial part of their business,
with a few of the more prominent examples including Li Ka-
shing's Cheung-Kong Holdings venturing into commercial and
residential real estate projects in Beijing and Shanghai, and Gordon
Wu's Hopewell Holdings undertaking a Guangdong-Hong Kong
highway and several power projects.5" During the 1980s and
1990s, China business also came to be a principal raison d'etre for
the Hong Kong offices of multinational corporations and
international banks, consulting firms, and law firms. Recent
surveys have found that there are thousands of foreign firms with
regional headquarters or offices in Hong Kong, and that more
than half of U.S. firms cite the China market as their major
reason for their presence in the territory.59
In addition to these developments on the investment side,
China has become Hong Kong's top trading partner by nearly all
measures. It is the primary source of, and destination for, re-
exports passing through the territory. And the largest share of
Hong Kong's exports now go to, and its imports come from, the
P.R.C.60
As the trade figures suggest, and especially in more recent
years, the road to economic integration has been a two-way street.
Large and influential Chinese state enterprises, some under direct
57 See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 53 (quoting the dean of a Hong Kong
university's business school); see generally, Sung, supra note 53, at 203-05.
SSee, e.g., Carl Goldstein, Property: Building for a Billion, FAR E. ECON.
REV., July 16, 1992, at 41-42; Paul Handley, The Woes of Gordon Wu,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1996, at 115.
"' See, e.g., American Firms Cherish Full Confidence in China and Hong Kong
Markets, Xinhua News Agency, June 22, 1993 (reporting on survey by
American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong); HK Becomes Regional Center
in Asia/Paci/ic, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 20, 1995, in BBC, Survey of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
' See, e.g., Leonard K. Cheng, Trade and Industry. 1997 and Beyond, in
FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 175, 176-81
(foseph S. Cheng & Sonny S.H. Lo eds., 1995); P.T. Bangsberg, Census Report:
Re-exports Continue to Dominate Hong Kong's Trade, J. COMMERCE, Feb. 25,
1997, at 5A; Hong Kong Government Trade Department, Economic and Trade
Information on HongKong (visited Mar. 31, 1997) <http://www.info.gov.hk>.
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central government control, have moved to acquire significant
stakes in the territory's businesses. Particularly high-profile
examples include the acquisition by an arm of the P.R.C.'s China
International Trade and Investment Corporation (CITIC Pacific)
of substantial shares in key Hong Kong utilities and its flagship
airline (whose parent company, Swire, is one of the territory's
two most venerable hong), and the establishment of T.T. Tsui's
New China Hong Kong Group as a vehicle for state-owned and
well-connected P.R.C. enterprises to join with prominent Hong
Kong players to invest in Hong Kong and mainland business
opportunities." More broadly, a rumored central directive in
1995 told Chinese state-owned companies to increase their
holdings in Hong Kong entities. 2 By some estimates, the P.R.C.
has become the third largest source of foreign direct investment
in Hong Kong, accounting for perhaps tens of billions of dollars
in capital inflows.63
In recent years, new business structures and vehicles have
arisen to manage, and to extend, the increasingly complex
economic entanglement between the two economies. Consortia
like the New China Hong Kong Group, and H-share listings by
state-owned enterprises, are some of the more simple examples.
Others include so-called "red chip" companies, an informal elite
subset of companies listed on non-P.R.C. exchanges and controlled
by powerful Chinese state entities. Somewhat more exotic
techniques are also used, such as "backdoor listings," in which
P.R.C.-controlled enterprises take over preexisting Hong Kong
companies, merge or transfer assets, and thereby gain access to the
capital markets available to Hong Kong-listed companies.
Another alternative involves new or reorganized Hong Kong
companies structured to hold shares in mainland enterprises, and
thus to offer the wary investor a way of investing in China
without having to deal directly with P.R.C. companies, laws, and
61 See, e.g., The Chinese Takeover of Hong Kong, Inc., ECONOMIST, May 7,
1994, at 35-36; Catherine Field, The Selling ofa Grand OldAirline, WORLDBUSI-
NESS, July/Aug. 1996, at 12; Jonathan Karp, The New Insiders, FAR E. ECON.
REV., May 27, 1993, at 62.
62 See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Great Leap Southward, FARE. ECON. REV., Nov.
23, 1995; Bruce Gilley, Here Come the jitters, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 25,
1996, at 54.
63 See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 53; Wang Xiangwei, Turning a Deeper Shade
of Red, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at 2.
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regulators."M
As some participants and observers see it, such concrete
economic changes have brought greater harmonization of business
and legal cultures in Hong Kong and China, primarily through
Hong Kong's transition toward a Chinese model. Although the
accuracy of this perception is nearly impossible to verify, its
existence is amply reflected in a journalistic and popular obsession
with gauging who in Hong Kong business circles is well-connected
with the territory's future masters, and in moves by some
prominent Hong Kong companies and business organizations to
replace expatriate executives with locals assumed to have better
"connections" (guanxi) with those who will be in a position to
award lucrative contracts, dispense governmental largesse, grant
favors, and impose burdens after 1997. In the more mundane and
better established business of pursuing small-scale joint ventures
and the like in the P.R.C., conventional wisdom and patterns of
investment suggest that capital has flowed along the lines of long-
standing informal ties - typically back to the Hong Kong
investor's home village or county, where superior access to
information and the availability of informal norms of behavior
and mechanisms of enforcement can make up for an inability or
unwillingness to rely primarily on written contracts and a threat
of judicial enforcement. 65
Moreover, there is something to be said for the position that
the supposed "sinicization" of Hong Kong's business and business-
" See, e.g., Hong Kong Shares: Red Chips Today, Blues Tomorrow, ECONO-
MIST, June 26, 1993, at 83; Red Chips: The Preferred Vehicle, ASIA MONEY, Dec.
1996-Jan. 1997, at 43; Gary Silverman, Miracle Man, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan.
16, 1997, at 58 (concerning Li Ka-shing's restructuring of his holding compa-
nies, affecting interests of investors seeking a conduit for indirect China invest-
ments).
65 See, e.g., EZRA F. VOGEL, ONE STEP AHEAD IN CHINA: GUANGDONG
UNDER REFORM 60-69 (1989) (describing Hong Kong-Guangdong investment
ties and economic integration in reform era, including significance of informal
relationships and information access); Sung, supra note 53, at 186-88, 205-07;
Louis Kraar, Larry Yung: The Man to Know in Hong Kong, FORTUNE, Jan. 13,
1997, at 102-06 descri~ing the rise and central role of the head of CITIC
Pacific, the P.R.C. owned Hong Kong company, on the eve of reversion);
Preparing for China, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1997, at 58-59 (discussing leading
Hong Kong businessman Li Ka-shing's P.R.C. connections and his
maneuverings in anticipation of 1997); see also Mark Sharp, Warning for Deng
Related Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 23, 1997, at 5 (describing views
held in China and Hong Kong that prominent firms with ties to Deng Xiao-
ping's family were at risk, and less attractive to investors, once Deng died).
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related legal environments may not mean as much change as some
think. On this view, the perception of a wide gap, however
rapidly closing, is misplaced. It is the product of a misleading
focus on the formal rules and structures of Hong Kong's system
of commercial and corporate law, which do not effectively
structure the behavior of any but the most internationalized
segments of business in the territory. The "rule of law" under-
girding coldly rational and impersonal business dealings has never
been, on this account, all that it is often claimed to be in the
colony. From this perspective, the reliance on guanxi, shared
values, and non-legal sanctions that some see, and dread, as a mark
of change in the territory is not so new. All that has changed is
that mainland actors - among whom similar and compatible
orientations and practices have reemerged strongly during the
reform period - have become increasingly deeply woven into the
web of an informal and extralegal order.66
On the other hand, there has also been significant convergence
from the P.R.C. side. Although problems of corruption and poor
implementation are serious and extensive reliance on informal
channels continues, the rapid development of a much-used and
partially-effective legal system for business, and especially for
foreign trade and investment, remains a striking feature of the
reform era. Hong Kong-based businesses and others have
demanded and encouraged such movement toward a system that
provides some elements of the legal rules and legal certainty that
they have come to expect in Hong Kong and in other places
deeply integrated with the global economy.'
6 See, e.g., Batson, supra note 53 (describing the shift of influence to firms
and executives with strong informal P.R.C. ties); Frank Ching, Danger Signals
for Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV, Oct. 17, 1996, at 36 (quoting Xinhua's
summary of Jiang Zemin interview discounting the importance of the rule of
law in Hong Kong's past success); Preparation Means Success; No Preparation
Means Failure, WEN WEI PO, Dec. 12, 1993, at 2; Chris Yeung & Connie Law,
China Hits Patten for Deal with Jardines, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 14,
1994, at 1 (discussing charges of British authorities' politically motivated
favoritism in dealing with local Hong Kong firms).
67 See generally Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart J. Valentine, Foreign Direct
Investment in the People's Republic of China: Progress, Problems and Proposals, 1
J. CHINESE L. 117 (1987); Daniel Fung, Survival of the Rule of Law in Hong
Kong After the Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
41 (1997); John T. Shinkle, Observations on Capital Market Regulation: Hong
Kong and the People's Republic of China, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 255
(1997). Much of this move toward "Western" or "international" norms was
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3.2. Politics and Government: Parallels, Convergence, and the
Irrelevance of Ideology
In the politics and governance of Hong Kong, there is much
that points to a long transition narrowing a Hong Kong-P.R.C.
gap that arguably is less yawning than it sometimes has appeared
to be. In the political sphere, as in the economic realm, colonial
Hong Kong has been, for much of its history, vulnerable to
China, and therefore dependent upon it. At least throughout the
P.R.C. era, British-ruled Hong Kong's security has relied on
China's military and political forbearance, a state of affairs that
imposed an implicit check on the tolerance of "anti-P.R.C."
activities in the territory (although not on the government's
suppression of pro-communist organizations and activists), and
precluded serious consideration of decolonization leading to
independence for Hong Kong. After Great Britain and the PR.C.
reached an agreement returning the territory to China (a result
that China had long insisted was the only acceptable resolution),
movement toward a more extensive and less tacit integration of
Chinese and Hong Kong politics and government accelerated.
The Joint Declaration itself provided for a Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group (JLG") empowered to conduct bilateral "consulta-
tions" on the implementation of the Joint Declaration and on
"such subjects as may be agreed by the two sides," and to "discuss
matters relating the smooth transfer" of government authority
over Hong Kong during the 1985-2000 period. In keeping with
this mandate, the JLG has been a significant venue for addressing
the legal and political-structural questions of the transition
(although not the only one, nor a uniformly successful one). In
addition to its enumerated and originally contemplated functions,
the JLG has also served as a forum for attempting to resolve other
concrete, transition-related controversies of the 1980s and 1990s.
Most famous among these was the wrangle over building new
airport and shipping facilities. Because these projects required the
granting of large public contracts straddling the handback date,
they raised Chinese concerns that the British authorities might be
mortgaging Hong Kong's future, and prompted Chinese threats to
clearly by design. Many of China's reform-era economic laws have been
consciously based on Western models and, in some cases, influenced by advisers
and consultants from the West or trained there.
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disavow the contracts - spawning a controversy that for a time
expanded the JLG's prominence in the territory's pre-reversion
affairs and underscored for many Hong Kongers the growing
entanglement of P.R.C. and Hong Kong politics."
The JLG's formal authority and actual role was still modest
compared with that of other organs set up, especially in later
years. The middle 1980s saw the creation of the Basic Law
Drafting Committee ("BLDC") which included thirty-six P.R.C.
members and twenty-three P.R.C.-approved Hong Kong members
(including a pair of prominent democrats). Created by and
reporting to the NPC, the BLDC was charged with drafting the
"mini-constitution" to set forth the key structures and fundamen-
tal rules for government and law in the S.A.R.69 The 1990s
brought a Preliminary Working Committee ("PWC") and a
Preparatory Committee ("PC"). Established by the NPC Standing
Committee in the wake Governor Patten's franchise-expanding
constitutional reforms, and composed of P.R.C.-approved Hong
Kong members and an almost equal number of P.R.C. members,
the PWC was given a mandate to prepare the ground for the
establishment of the PC and, in practice, to exert greater Chinese
control over a transition process in which the British were no
longer cooperating to China's satisfaction. Established with NPC
authorization in January 1996 and required by legislation to draw
at least half of its members from Hong Kong (and the rest from
the mainland), the PC was directed to undertake such vital tasks
as prescribing the specific method for forming the first S.A.R.
legislature, preparing the establishment of the Selection Commit-
tee for the first S.A.R. government, and more generally "preparing
the establishment" of the S.A.R. In practice, its role increasingly
approached that of a shadow government, speaking with consider-
able authority on a host of legal, economic, and other issues
6 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, annex II; see also Stacy Mosher,
Creeping Interventionism, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 18, 1991, at 10 (concerning
JLG s Airport Commission).
69 See, e.g., ji Pengfei Addresses Hong Kong Basic Law Committee, Xinhua
News Agency, July 1, 1985, in BBC, Survey of World Broadcasts, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (discussing the speech given by BLDC
chairman at BLDC's initial meeting, outlining Committee's mandate from the
NPC); see generally Ming K. Chan, Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the
Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90, in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW:
BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILIrY AND PROSPERITY" UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGN-
TY? 3 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991).
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concerning the transition. Most notoriously, in January 1997, the
PC formally recommended (via its legal sub-group) the repeal of
recently enacted Hong Kong legislation that had offered belated
protection for a variety of liberal political rights.70
As the final months of British rule approached, setting up and
staffing the S.A.R.'s key governmental institutions in advance of
the hand-over became the order of the day. After the P.R.C.-
backed Selection Committee of four hundred Hong Kong
residents nominated Tung Chee-hwa as Chief Executive and
picked a "Provisional Legislature" or "Provisional Legislative
Council" ("PLC") to replace the last colonial Legco, and with a
"through train" still promised for the civil service, the key
elements of a full government-in-waiting were in place by late
1996. With the lame duck quality of the colonial regime increas-
ingly evident, Governor Patten had already laid the groundwork
for advancing the transition a step further, having pledged
consultation and cooperation with the Chief Executive-designate
(in addition to having urged an "early" selection of an occupant
for the post). The government-to-be took matters a step or two
further in early 1997, with the future Chief Executive weighing in
- and supporting China's position - on such matters as the
advisability of repealing the controversial political and civil
liberties legislation of the terminal colonial period, and with the
Provisional Legislature convening in Shenzhen and asserting its
70 See, e.g., NPC Decision, supra note 47, S 2-3 (authorizing PC); All Set
for Hong Kong's Return, Says Qian Qichen, Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 10,
1997, in BBC, Survey of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File (describing NPC's adoption of PC recommendation on repealing
Hong Kong law reforms); Foreign Minister Reviews Recent History of Hong Kong
Reversion, Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 10, 1997, in BBC, Survey of Worla
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (noting comments
of PC chairman and P.R.C. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen regarding reviewing
powers and activities of PC); New Working Panel Members Appointed for Hong
Kong Transition, Xinhua News Agency, May 26, 1994, in BBC, Survey of
Wofid Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing
the functions and expansion of PWC); Tsang Yok-sing, Selecting the Right
Electoral System, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at 16 (mentioning
the leader of pro-China Hong Kong party commenting on PC's consideration
of electoral laws); Work of Preparatory Committee for HK SAR Praised by
Legislator, Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 3, 1997, in BBC, Survey of World
Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File (describing the work
of PWC and PC).
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authority to consider legislation for post-1997 Hong Kong.71
More broadly, an extensive pre-1997 transition to Chinese rule,
on China's terms, has seemed evident in the outcome of many
debates over the S.A.R.'s legal and political structures, at least
when viewed from the vantage point of those in Hong Kong who
have been critical of the British and colonial authorities' handling
of those issues. Frequently cited examples of the asserted slide
toward P.R.C. norms and preferences read like a catalogue of the
major political and legal institutional controversies of the 1980s
and 1990s. The Basic Law drafted by the BLDC during the latter
part of the 1980s arguably fell short of the promises of the Joint
Declaration, or at least resolved the Joint Declaration's ambiguities
in a direction unfavorable to proponents of a strongly autono-
mous and broadly liberal-democratic Hong Kong. Coming
without strong objection from Britain or its administration in
Hong Kong (both of which were not formally involved in the
drafting process), the Basic Law permitted restrictions on demo-
cratic elections, judicial review, and individual liberties that
seemed tighter than what the Joint Declaration mandated.7 2
71 See, e.g., NPC Decision, supra note 47, § 3-4 (prescribing Selection
Committee membership and functions); China Welcomes Election of Firt Chief
Executive, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 11, 1996; Foreign Minister Reviews Recent
History of Hong Kong Reversion, supra note 70; Wang Hui Ling, Ex-Patten
Adviser Elected Head of Provisional Body, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 26,
1997, at 13 (quoting PLC members on the organ's powers and agenda); John
Ridding & Philip Stephens, Patten Firm Over HK Legislature, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1996, at 5 (quoting the Governor's reiteration of support for early selection
of the Chief Executive, intention to cooperate with Chief Executive-designate,
and refusal to recognize Provisional Legislature).
72 Compare Joint Declaration, supra note 1, annex I, S I (stating S.A.R.
legislature 'shall be constituted by elections") with Basic Law, supra note 4, art.
68 (qualifying Joint Declaration language, adding that the method for forming
the Legislative Council shall be specified in light of the actual situation in theS.A.R. and "in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress"with the "ltimate aim being election by universal suffrage), and Joint
Declaration, supra note 1, annex I, _ a II (granting the "power of final
judgment" and judicial independence to S.A.R. courts and investing them with
"independent judicial power" "[elxcept for foreign and defense affairs") withBasic Law, supra note 4, arts. 19, 160 ranting the NPC Standing Committee
authority to interpret the Basic Law, denying S.A.R. courts jurisdiction over"acts of state" such as defense and foreign affairs, and Joint Declaration, supra
note 1, annex I, XIII (listing specific rights andproviding that the provisions
of the principal U.N. covenants shall remain in force) with Basic Law, supra
note 4, arts. 24-38, 39, 23 (restating Joint Declaration catalogue of rights,
arguably making them more dependent upon and subject to restriction by [ocal
legislation, and obliging the S.A.R. legislature to enact laws against treason,
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In the 1990s, the Court of Final Appeal arrangement that
emerged from Sino-British negotiations acquiesced in China's
position limiting to one the number of expatriates who could
serve on the five-member bench, and delayed establishment of the
court until the last possible moment. The controversial and
initially secret agreement on the court's membership exacted what
Hong Kong critics saw as an unacceptable concession to P.R.C.-
style legality. One bill to implement it met with a negative vote
in Legco. A similar bill passed four years later, but also precipitat-
ed an attempt by Legco liberals to pass a no-confidence vote
against the Patten government (a move that, even if successful,
would have been only of symbolic importance).73
During the same period, colonial authorities also yielded -
much too meekly in the eyes of the territory's ardent democrats
- to China's opposition to expanding Hong Kong representative
bodies' electoral base and their role in the colony's government.
Patten's reforms were themselves rather modest. The electoral
law changes were crafted to be defensible as interpretations of the
Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, and stopped well short of
full universal suffrage. The governor's policy of expanding
Legco's role also left it with powers still much more limited than
those of a conventional legislature.74 Once China made clear
that it flatly rejected those moves, dismissing the electoral reforms
as in contravention of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and
shadowy Sino-British informal agreements, and declaring that the
Legco elected under those laws would not be allowed to "ride the
through train" to become the S.A.R.'s first legislature, the British
authorities publicly expressed regret and disappointment at
China's unwise decision. But they eschewed more confrontational
courses urged by some of the territory's pro-democracy politi-
cians, which included calls for a more thoroughgoing move
sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and maintenance of ties with foreign
political organizations).
' See, e.g., Stacy Mosher, Court of Contention, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec.
19, 1991, at 10 (discussing the defeat of 1991 court bill); Louis Won &
Catherine Ng, Fight Not Over, says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST July
27, 1995, at 1 (discussing the passage of 1995 bill); Chris Yeung & No Kwai-
yan, Governor Survives Vote, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 13, 1995, at 1
(describing failure of the no-confidence motion).
74 See supra notes 28-30.
1997]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
toward universal suffrage for Legco.75
Along with the lessons drawn from such moments of confron-
tation or capitulation on specific issues of the S.A.R.'s legal and
political structure, a more diffuse sense has developed over several
years that the Hong Kong branch of the official Xinhua News
Agency (China's longstanding de facto embassy in the territory)
and the P.R.C. State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office have been speaking for those who hold real power in the
territory. The widely held perception is that Britain had ceded
much of the field in Hong Kong politics and government well in
advance of 1997 - whether prematurely (a reflection of British
indifference and irresponsibility) or inevitably (a pragmatic
recognition of the U.K.'s extremely weak position once the basic
point of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereign authority
had been conceded).
Despite the electoral triumphs of parties quite critical of the
P.R.C.'s plans for the territory, Hong Kong's nascent party and
parliamentary politics also has features that suggest a gradual
convergence and integration underway for years. For example,
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
("DAB"), and other less prominent and less successful organiza-
tions, emerged to articulate positions favorable to the P.R.C. and
to field candidates in Hong Kong's increasingly contentious and
democratic elections during the 1990s. Moving beyond the
representation of P.R.C.-sanctioned views in Hong Kong's "left"
or "pro-China" press, Tsang Yok-sing and other DAB leaders
emerged as a new kind of voice in the political debates of the era.
Their statements have received extensive coverage in the main-
stream press alongside the views expressed by Democratic Party
s In the P.R.C.'s jargon, Patten's plan suffered from the "three non-
conformities" - non-conformity with the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and
a series of secret Sino-British agreements concerning the transition. On
democratization proposals in Hong Kong after the P.R.C. announced that the
through train would be derailed if the Patten reforms were adopted. See, e.g.,
Peter Humphrey, China Sets Up New Legislature, Punishes Dissenter, Reuters,
Mar. 24, 1996 (describing British opposition to establishment of PLC and
planned disbanding of Legco); H.K Candidates Scrambling Before Sunday's Poll,
Japan Econ. Newswire, Sept. 16, 1995 (discussing Democratic Party's call for
fully elected legislature); Louise do Rosario, Patten's Progress, FAR E. ECON.
REV., July 14, 1994, at 21 (describing Emily Lau's proposal, one that came close
to winning a majority in Legco, calling for universal suffrage for all seats in the
1995 Legco elections).
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notables and other pro-democracy politicians, representatives of
the Liberal Party and other "pro-business conservative" organiza-
tions, and spokespersons for the colonial government's positions.
In addition, members of the territory's business elite who have
not been members of the DAB or other China-backed parties, but
who have pressed what are generally labeled "pro-China" views,
have held a considerable number of seats in Legco and the cabinet-
like, policy advice-providing Executive Council ("Exco"). Indeed,
the alliance between pro-China members and so-called business
conservatives anchored a Legco coalition that came within one
vote of defeating Patten's proposed electoral reforms in 1994, and
provided crucial support for the 1995 Court of Final Appeal bill
that Democratic Party leaders and their allies so bitterly de-
nounced.76
Whether members of Legco, Exco, and pro-business political
parties, or only of a broader economic elite, "pro-China" business
leaders or "business conservatives" have done much to effect a
significant political integration between Hong Kong and China
during the decade-and-a-half before 1997. Members of a group
that had long enjoyed great formal and informal influence with
the colonial government, some of the leading lights of Hong Kong
business steadily acquired roles as advisers to, and intermediaries
with, China. Their actions included undertaking unofficial
"pilgrimages" to Beijing to discuss Hong Kong's fate with Deng
Xiaoping even before the U.K. and China signed the Joint
Declaration, winning designation as quasi-official "advisers" to
China, and joining recognized "pro-China" Hong Kong members
on the key transitional organs known by an alphabet soup of
initials that has characterized recent Hong Kong politics: the
BLDC, the BLCC, the PWC, the PC, and the PLC.2'
The early and, to many, odd alliance between self-proclaimed
avatars of Chinese-style socialism and captains of capitalist
industry suggests that any political and governmental gap that
needed to be closed or accommodated in the run-up to reversion
was smaller than it may have seemed. And there is much to
76 See, e.g., Mary Kwang, What Victory? STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), July 2,
1994, at 4 (describing the vote on political reform bills); Chris Yeung et al.,
Fight Not Over, Says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 27, 1995, at
1 (describing Legco alignment on the Court bill).
'7 See generally deLisle & Lane, supra note 18, and supra notes 70, 71.
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suggest that the gap was shrinking for reasons having less to do
with Hong Kong's reversion than with independent pressures for
changing the increasingly anachronistic structures of Hong Kong's
colonialism and China's Leninism.
In some respects, the understandings of politics and govern-
ment that have emerged in recent years among elites on opposite
sides of Hong Kong's colonial boundary have not been poles
apart. The post-Mao reforms in China have produced a regime
that has staked its legitimacy on securing economic prosperity,
and has bet that the way to do so is through encouraging or
requiring firms to be more geared toward seeking profit, more
attuned to market signals, and more engaged in the international
economy. A Hong Kong taipan could find little to quibble with
in the view that this is what politics is properly about. Moreover,
China's embrace of a political agenda strongly favoring markets,
trade, and business was more unrestrained in the prospering
provinces nearest Hong Kong than it was in Beijing - so much
so that the central authorities have sometimes worried about the
"Hong Kongization" of a region to which Beijing's writ does not
effectively run when it tries to impose moderate austerity or
modest political orthodoxy.
78
At the level of more specific policies, the chronic fiscal burden
of footing the "welfare" bills (as well as the on-going core
operating deficits) of unreformed state enterprises has produced
among some P.R.C. leaders a concern about ruinous social
spending that has dove-tailed with the attitudes of Hong Kong's
notoriously laissez-faire business establishment. In Beijing policy
circles, the problem of the "iron rice bowl" (tie'wan) (secure tenure
of state enterprise employees) and its attendant web of services
(including housing, schooling, and pensions) has, in recent years,
steadily climbed in the rankings of perceived obstacles to further
market-oriented economic reform laws and policies.79
During the same period, a parallel set of worries was growing
on the other side of the border. In Hong Kong business circles,
73 See generally, VOGEL, supra note 65; LIEBERTHAL, supra note 26, at 315-
30.
79 See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 33, at 169-74 226-28; NAUGHTON, supra note
13, at 284-88; Attach Great Importance to Implementing Conscientiously the Re-
Employment Project, RENMIN RIBAO, Jan. 29, 1971, at 1; Edward Cody, China
Mills Close a Chapter, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 6, 1997, at 1; see also supra note
15.
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a long-standing dogma that expanding the welfare state would sap
the dynamism of Hong Kong's work force, and a strong aversion
to paying the taxes necessary to support social spending collided
with the Patten administration's proposals to provide greater
social security benefits for elderly Hong Kongers while also
continuing the colony's vast subsidized housing program and
other social services. Such convergent sentiments among P.R.C.
political leaders and Hong Kong business leaders, together with
China's more immediate fears that the last colonial budgets were
imperiling the Hong Kong government's fiscal health, produced
a striking political alliance in opposition to the colonial govern-
ment's social spending initiatives.80
There is also an almost sociological dimension to the quasi-
ideological convergence of elites that has closed the Hong Kong-
China political gap during the years prior to the territory's
reversion. Amid the reform policies of the Deng Xiaoping era,
the most spectacularly ascendant elite in the P.R.C. (and not least
in the dynamic region abutting Hong Kong) has been a stratum
of cadres, and their relatives, turned entrepreneurs. Established
political power has transformed into new, complexly entangled
economic and political power. At the same time, in response to
the reforms in late colonial Hong Kong politics that have made
government more extensively consultative and at least modestly
democratic, the business elites of Hong Kong have become more
"political," making their voices heard more loudly in public
debates and engaging in electoral politics to secure new bases for
influence in institutions and processes that previously had not
mattered much or could be counted upon to pursue the interests
of business.8"
80 See, e.g., For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough,
ASIAWEEK, Dec. 7, 1994, at 23; Increasing Tax in Disguised Form, and Shifting
Misfortune to the Special Administrative Region, WEN WEI PO, Dec. 17, 1993,
at 2; Jonathan Karp, Money Talks, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 17, 1994, at 18;
William McGurn, Diminishing Returns, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 13, 1996, at
62.
s On cadre-entrepreneurs and relationships between cadres and entrepre-
neurs in reform-era China, see generally, JEAN 01, STATE AND PEASANT IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 183-226 (1989); SOLINGER, supra note 19, at 256-74.
At more elite levels, the phenomenon of intertwined economic and political
power is most starkly evident in the emergence of the taizidang - the group
of "princelings," who have taken prominent roles at major companies, and
helped those companies to prosper, by virtue of the political connections and
clout that stem from their status as children of Party elders. On the
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Such newly hybridized political-economic elites on both sides
of the China-Hong Kong frontier would seem to have reason to
embrace the broadly similar, and similarly tepid, attitudes toward
democracy that they do seem to hold. Plausibly confident that
the policy orientations they favor and the economic miracles they
have helped to produce enjoy popular support, both groups could
reasonably see little need for tight political repression or restric-
tions on the expression of heterodox views. Such a semi-tolerant
stance had greater appeal given that heavy-handed moves could
threaten to exact a significant economic cost by alienating
educated elements in the local work force or by scaring off foreign
investors who might be wary of political instability abroad (that
might put their profits and capital at unexpected risk) or political
pressure at home (not to invest in countries with poor records on
human rights and civil liberties).
On the other hand, both groups have had enough exposure to
the possible consequences of elections and popular opinion to be
wary of what full, contestatory democracy could mean for their
hold on power and the future of some of the policies they hold
dear. After all, the most strongly pro-business candidates have
fared poorly in contests for Hong Kong's most broadly-based
electoral constituencies, losing to "pro-democracy" candidates who,
business leaders have feared, might open the tap of profligate
government spending. While China's incumbent cadre-entrepre-
neurs have often come out winners in semi-open local elections
and expressed confidence that they would prevail in more open
contests as well, their record of success is mixed. And the growth
of popular discontent with some of reform's side effects, together
with the general disesteem in which the party is held, would
provide undeniably fertile ground for candidates running on a
platform critical of some established policies and many entrenched
privileges - especially if relatively open elections in China were
to be extended to less purely local offices.12
increasingly organized and visible public political role of business in Hong
Kong, see generally, MINERS, supra note 8, at 196-203; see also Bellette Lee,
Political Flag for Business, S. CHINA MORNING POST Oct. 23, 1990; James Tien,
HK Can Survive Under One Country, One System, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 2, 1993, at 11 (stating that business leaders accept Patten's point that
business should participate in electoral politics).
2 See supra note 33; Wu Naitao, Direct Election of Township Deputies,
BEIJING REV., Mar. 17-23, 1997, at 20 (concerning Chinese local elections); see
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3.3. "1997"i.Focused Strategies and the Prolonged Transition
Hong Kong's "long transition" is not just a function of
convergence and integration that have been occurring before July
1, 1997. For those not claiming clairvoyance and not persuaded
by an ideological assumption that the 1997 solution is destined to
succeed or doomed to fail, the transition promises to be "long" on
the far side of 1997 as well. Some vital questions about the shape
and character of Chinese-ruled Hong Kong are unlikely to be
answered until well after the founding of the S.A.R. At some
level, protracted uncertainty may be nearly inevitable whenever
potentially sweeping forces of change are introduced into an
environment that has been as complex, adaptable, and resilient as
Hong Kong has long shown itself to be. Facing the diverse
pressures that 1997 will introduce, Hong Kong seems likely to be
neither intractably hostile nor unquestionably pliable. Beyond
that, two more specific features of transitional Hong Kong point
to a prolonged period during which we are unlikely to see
definitive resolution of legal and institutional issues that matter for
Hong Kong's economic and political prospects.
First, the strategies of the principal participants in the political
struggle over Hong Kong's future order have focused so relentless-
ly on the "1997 question" that adaptation to the different
circumstances of post-reversion politics is likely to be a slow and
wrenching process. On the P.R.C. side, a shrill insistence on the
principle of China's absolute sovereignty over Hong Kong has
meant deep, and growing, intransigence in response to anything
suggesting the assertion of a "right" to autonomy or self-determi-
nation in Hong Kong. China has firmly rejected much of the Bill
of Rights Ordinance, related changes in substantive colonial
legislation, Patten's electoral reforms, and proposals for a more
powerful and clearly independent CFA in part because China has
tenerally, NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA WAKES 160-83
1994) (discussing peasant discontent); Stanley Rosen, The Impact ofReform Poli-
cies on Youth Attitudes, in CHINESE SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF TIANANMEN:
THE IMPACT OF REFORM 283 (Deborah Davis & Ezra F. Vogel eds., 1990)
(describing discontent and alienation among youth). On elections and business
parties in Hong Kong, see generally MINERS, supra note 8, at 115-20, Elfred
Vaughan Roberts, Poitical Developments in Hong Kong: Implications for 1997,
in 547 ANNALS 24, 27-35 (1996); Louise do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 28, 1995, at 16.
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construed such moves as attempts to usurp or undermine its
sovereignty over the territory, exceeding what China has autho-
rized in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Simply, the
dominant concern has been to prevent or to counter developments
before 1997 that might complicate or compromise China's exercise
of sovereignty after 1997.3
In P.R.C. and CCP legal and political theory, there is ample
room for the Chinese sovereign to grant, as a matter of prudence
and discretion, much more in the way of local autonomy,
protection of individual rights, and the like than China has been
willing to permit the colonial government to assert in these
instances. Once the events of July 1 officially recognize and more
firmly and formally establish that exercises of sovereignty over the
territory are for China alone to undertake directly or to delegate
to S.A.R. organs, a climb-down on such substantive issues should
become more politically tolerable to the P.R.C.1
4
Still, for several reasons, any such moves are likely to be
difficult in practice for some time to come. Positions that China
has so firmly embraced for so long are not easily reversed or
reformed in response to changed circumstances. After years of
confrontation and conflict, a certain cast-in-stone quality character-
izes China's distrust of Hong Kong's avowedly pro-democracy
forces, and of less visible and vocal elements in the civil service
and elsewhere who might have absorbed - too well for China's
tastes - the values of the departing colonial authorities. Such
habits of suspicion could well create a lingering impediment to
China's working effectively with almost any segment in Hong
Kong that has not clearly shown itself to be "pro-China" well in
advance of 1997.5
83 On these issues, see Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Hong Kong's
Endgame and the Rule of Law (If, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 195 (1997).
14 For a reflection of China's basic view in formal, legal sources, compare
Xianfa, supra note 32, pmbl, arts. 2-3, which declares the P.R.C. to be aunitary state" with all state power belonging to "the people" and to be
exercised by the National People's Congress and subordinate and local organs
"under the unified leadership of the central authorities"; and Basic Law, supra
note 4, art. 1, stating that H ong Kong is an inalienable part of the P.R.C. with
Xianfa, supra note 32, art. 31, which provides a wide latitude in establishing and
conferring powers upon S.A.R.s, and Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 2, which
grants the S.A.R. a "high degree of autonomy."
85 See, e.g., Cai Cheng Says Beijing Government Will Not Go to Hong Kong
to Arrest Hong Kong People for Doing Something in Hong Kong that Affects the
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Moreover, any inclination that does arise among the Chinese
leadership to revamp its approach toward various groups in the
territory may take some time to implement. Generally, any
major reorientation must overcome considerable inertia, and raises
the concern that a too-sudden shedding of old stances will make
new commitments not credible. Moreover, any such moves may
be further delayed by the politics of transition among the top
leadership that is still underway in Beijing. For leaders who are
not fully out of Deng's shadow and who are potentially vulnera-
ble to attacks from their colleagues and subordinates, there is little
appeal in a "soft" position that might be construed as undercutting
1997's triumphant reversal of nineteenth-century imperialist
affronts to the Chinese nation.
At the other end of the political spectrum, Hong Kong's
liberal activists, pro-democracy politicians, and, at times, the
colonial government have pursued a primarily pre-reversion-
focused agenda as well. The principal political initiatives of the
last decade all reflect an effort to give a pre-1997 head start to
institutions and rules that would embody and protect liberal
values, democratic norms, and the principle of Hong Kong's
autonomy. Thus, the Patten reforms sought to establish a
"through train"-riding Legco that was as broadly democratic and
as strongly representative as possible. The Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance was part of a move to make more liberal the Hong Kong
laws that would be handed over to the S.A.R. and preserved under
the pledge, in both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, to
retain the laws previously in force in Hong Kong.86 And
government proponents sought to defend the Court of Final
Appeal deal, flawed though it was, as a last best chance to get a
common law and liberal-constitutionalist court ensconced,
experienced, and invested with organizational momentum and
institutional gravitas in advance of the P.R.C.'s takeover of Hong
Mainland, PING KUO JIH PAO, Mar. 4, 1997, at A4 (stating NPC Law
Committee vice chairman reiterated China's determination not to let Hong
Kong become a base for subversion, but pledged moderation in pursuing
offenders in Hong Kong); Linda Choy, Tung Pledge to "Subversive"Alliance, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at 6 (describing a pledge by future Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa to tolerate and protect Hong Kong democrats whom
the P.R.C. has labelled subversive).
86 Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 8; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3),
annex I, § II.
1997]
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Kong.87
For some democrats pledging to remain active in post-1997
Hong Kong politics, the calculus underlying a short-term focus
and an often-confrontational stance has been obvious: The best
results are to be achieved by pushing as far and as hard as possible
for democratization and autonomy before 1997. While the
territory's new rulers may move to roll back such reforms, it will
be somewhat costly or difficult for them to do so. And a meeker
course of compromise offers no greater assurances that the more
modest promises it might produce would not be eroded or
betrayed even more easily. For their sometime allies among the
British authorities, the logic of a pre-1997 strategy (albeit one
more limited in its aims and more accommodating in its manner)
has been still more simple and self-evident: While their power
over Hong Kong has been waning steadily for years, they are,
simply, gone after July 1, left holding nothing more than an
effectively unenforceable claim at international law under a
bilateral agreement that China regards as something less weighty
than a treaty exchanging Britain's renunciation of sovereignty for
China's guarantees about how Hong Kong is to be ruled.88
Whether this 1997-focused approach, with its disputed
successes and its substantial disappointments, or a more post-1997-
focused alternative will appear, in retrospect, to have been the
more promising tack for a liberal and legalist agenda for post-
reversion Hong Kong is uncertain. What the road taken clearly
has done is to leave us less able to discern what a strategy in
" See generally Frank Ching, Toward Colonial Sunset: The Wilson Regime,
1987-1992, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND
BRITAIN, 1842-1992 173, 189-91 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994); Louise do Rosario,
No Appeal, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 18, 1995, at 22 (quoting Attorney General
Mathews argument that the 1995 bill should be accepted in order to prevent a
judicial vacuum and a license for China to adopt a still-less palatable court
arrangement).
88 See, e.g., George Hicks, Trouble Ahead in Hong Kong?, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 4, 1996 (arguing that the tactics and successes of Hong Kong's most
uncompromising democrats have made a roll-back or crack-down more costly
for Beijing); Simon Holberton, Detour for the Through Train: Chris Patten's
Proposals for Greater Democracy in Hong Kong are a High-Risk Strategy, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 10, 1992, at 20 (quoting Martin Lee on Democrats'
perspective that democratic reforms were worthwhile despite Chinese threats);
Diane Stormont, Rijkind, Tung No Meeting of Minds on Hong Kong, Reuters,
Feb. 16, 1997 (quoting pro-Beijing Legco member's dismissal of British
authorities as already irrelevant).
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pursuit of the same general goals will look like after 1997, when
the battles to be fought, and the array of forces to be considered,
change by virtue of the transfer of sovereign authority to Chinese
hands, and the installation of a P.R.C.-backed (and P.R.C.-picked)
S.A.R. government.
Two of the early instances of the new politics of addressing
truly post-1997 issues further illustrate the point. Political leaders
on the "liberal" or "pro-democracy" side recently have been
scrambling to form, and jockeying for position within, new
organizations that hope, in some form and to some degree, to
assume the mantle worn in pre-1997 Hong Kong by the Demo-
cratic Party and its predecessors, the United Democrats of Hong
Kong and Meeting Point. Among the issues at stake early in this
process have been distinctly post-reversion questions, such as
whether to reject completely the possibility of membership in or
cooperation with the legislature that will take office on July 1,
1997; what compromises (if any) to make in order to cultivate
channels of communication with China; whether to contest the
1998 elections for the S.A.R.'s first legislature; what electoral
rules, structures of constituencies (single or multi-member
districts) and standards of eligibility for candidates are acceptable
or desirable for those elections; and whether pro-democracy
politicians would be better off forming new parties or rallying
around the established Democratic Party which has been the
strongest political organization in the territory but which has been
most strongly condemned by China. 9
The positions articulated in the very different context of
battles focused on late colonial era electoral reform, and other
issues of the 1980s and 1990s, do not neatly generate views about
such concrete questions of the post-1997 world. Indeed, pro-
democracy politicians' forced one-year exile from legislative
politics might have a silver lining (assuming the hiatus in open
89 New groupings include Frontier, in which the uncompromisingly pro-
democracy indepen ent legislator Emily Lau plays a prominent role, and the
People's Rights Party planned by the more moderate pro-democracy indepen-
dent legislator Christine Loh. On the groupings and the issues that have
sometimes divided the democratic camp looking beyond 1997, see David Chu,
Fact and Fiction in the New Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 14,
1996, at 18; Dominic Lau, Few Economic Fears as HK Heads for China
Handover, Reuters, Mar. 2, 1997; Pilar Pereyra, HK Politics Looking Good 100
Days Before Handover, Japan Econ. Newswire, Mar, 22,1997; Fanny Wong, Lob
Looks for Company, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 2, 1996, at 19.
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elections does end in 1998). For all its evident perils, an involun-
tary post-reversion sabbatical appears to have the virtue of giving
them a chance to reflect, reorganize, and reorient, and to get a
better sense of the new regime's shape and tone before they have
to react coherently.
On the "pro-China" side, the naming of Tung Chee-hwa as
Chief Executive-designate, followed by the assembling of other
major pieces of a S.A.R. government-in-waiting, has brought a
complex series of posturings and proddings that reflect the
problems of adjustment from what had been a heavily pre-1997
focused approach. Tung Chee-hwa has sometimes refused the
Basic Law-prescribed term "designate" as a qualifier to his title,
and China has deemed the Provisional Legislature free to begin
considering legislation for the Hong Kong S.A.R. from its
temporary quarters across the border in Shenzhen. With such
moves, the tactics pursued in earlier conflicts over the legislative
through-train and the Court of Final Appeal have been reversed
in key respects. The China and pro-China side has switched from
trying to delay the effective operating date of controversial
institutions to trying to advance it. Where China and its allies
had worried about the development of "subversive" or govern-
ment-weakening practices and orientations in organs that the
colonial authorities were planning to foist on the S.A.R., the
P.R.C. and its supporters have recently worked to gather power
and establish momentum for the more politically reliable organs
of their own creation. This has meant obtaining for them a more
prominent place at the table in Hong Kong's pre-1997 governance
where the British authorities have been willing to cooperate, and
asserting their authority to parallel (and ultimately to supersede)
the activities of current Hong Kong institutions where the
colonial government has been more recalcitrant.
Efforts to justify and explain such moves have necessarily
entailed a wrenching reorientation away from the types of
arguments that China and its allies had earlier deployed. Where
the P.R.C. and its supporters once had attacked British colonial
authorities' moves to create or reform local laws and institutions
as incompatible with the spirit and substance of the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law (if not always the literal and
ambiguous text), China now has had to defend its seemingly
analogous moves as not inconsistent with the texts and as actions
that the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law could not properly
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have prohibited. Against the backdrop of a pre-1997-focused line
that had repeatedly chastised the British authorities for moves that
sought, in effect, to extend Britain's exercise of sovereignty
beyond the reversion, there could be no easy shift to a new line
dismissing British criticisms of the future regime's premature grab
for power as an impermissible interference with China's "internal
affairs." Certainly, China's sharp invocation of its domestic
jurisdiction accords with its long-standing position that Hong
Kong has always been part of China. Still, the new arguments
about the Chief Executive and the Provisional Legislature, when
juxtaposed with China's assault on the Hong Kong government's
institution-creating and law-reforming moves of the early and
middle 1990s, has produced especially serious concerns of
hypocrisy and a lack of bona fides?°
This situation has also made Tung Chee-hwa's position
particularly delicate and thus added another complicating factor
for any early assessment of the S.A.R. regime-in-practice.
Convincing much of Hong Kong that Tung's executive-led
government will be autonomous and independent would be a
delicate and difficult task under the best of circumstances. But it
has become harder in the wake of the radical shifts from a pre-
1997-focused strategy that, to many, seem to suggest that a drive
to maximize Chinese control over Hong Kong is the only thread
of continuity in China's Hong Kong policy. In this context,
Tung's position in favor of rolling back late colonial liberaliza-
tions of the Public Securities and Societies Ordinances is all the
90 See, e.g., TA KUNG PAO, Feb. 5, 1997, at 10 (denouncing the Bill of
Rights Ordinance as incompatible with Joint Declaration and Basic Law
provision on retaining laws in force); Tai Ming Cheung, Pressure Tactics, FAR
E. ECON. REV., Nov. 5, 1992, at 8 (describing Chinese criticism of Patten
reforms as incompatible with Basic Law and Joint Declaration); China Tells
Britain Not to Me dle with HK, Japan Econ. Newswire, Jan. 23, 1997 (describing
P.R.C. criticism of British attempts to resist revisions to Bill of Rights and
electoral laws as impermissible interference in Chinese "internal matter"); Bruce
Gilley, Jumping the Gun, FAR E. ECON REv., Feb. 6, 1997, at 14 (describing
Chinese arguments concerning PLC and Chief Executive); Nomination of
Provisional Legislature Candidates Formally Starts, WEN WEI Po, Nov. 18, 1996,
at A2 (asserting that Provisional Legislature is not inconsistent with Basic Law
or the NPC Decision); Provisional Legislature Must Operate Before 1997, WEN
WEI PO, Aug. 31, 1996, at A2 (asserting PLC's authority to begin legislative
operations before July 1); Chris Yeung, Tung in a Legal Tangle, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 17 (describing the Chinese view of Bill of
Rights as British plot to weaken the S.A.R.).
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more likely to look like a mere parroting of Beijing's long-
standing threats to gut the Bill of Rights and related legal changes,
and not like a genuine Lee Kwan Yew-style conservative's vision
of social order and economic prosperity that Tung claims to es-
pouse.91
A second feature of transitional Hong Kong that makes likely
a lengthy post-1997 period of de facto transition concerns the
attitudes and beliefs held by vital but less publicly vocal or openly
partisan segments of Hong Kong's populace. As the participants
in the often-polarized political struggles over Hong Kong's future
order themselves have often insisted, much about the prospects for
the legal and institutional arrangements for the S.A.R., and the
general character of Hong Kong's future order, depends on such
matters of social and political context.
On this front as well, the key questions seem likely to yield
no clear answers in the immediate aftermath of reversion: Is the
generally bullish view expressed by Hong Kong's economic elites
genuine, or is it merely an attempt to curry favor with Hong
Kong's future rulers and regulators, the post-1997 dispensers of
government contracts and political favors? Does a real sense of
security follow from business leaders' apparent confidence in
China's calculation of its own self-interest, in the success of Hong
Kong firms' and magnates' efforts to cultivate political connec-
tions with powerful actors on the mainland, in the innate
buoyancy of Hong Kong's economy, and in the credibility of
China's pledges to maintain a sound legal environment for the
territory's economy? Or does the sanguine public face mask a
more cautious, even pessimistic, attitude, one replete with fears
about an eroding rule of law for business and its adverse economic
consequences? Are companies' strategies of shifting of assets, legal
and financial services, corporate domiciles, and "law governing"
clauses in contracts to other jurisdictions merely, as some describe
them, low-cost insurance that most firms do not think they will
need to use? Or do such moves reflect deep and widespread
worries about the future legal and political environment for
business? Whatever their actual subjective views of Hong Kong's
post-1997 prospects, are the bulk of the territory's business leaders
correct in their assessments of what framework of laws and
9' See generally Margaret Ng, Lead Us To Transparency, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at 17.
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institutions Hong Kong's economy will have and what it will
need beyond 1997?92
The same types of questions hang over other key groups, and
are equally hard to answer. How will the civil service fare under,
and react to, Chinese rule in practice? Will the promises of a
"through train" (denied to Hong Kong's legislators) and assurances
that the civil service will not be "politicized" be implemented, and
will they be enough to maintain morale and effectiveness? Does
Chief Secretary Anson Chan's highly visible commitment to stay
on in her job at the top of the service accurately symbolize of an
executive branch staff poised to continue an unbroken tradition
of service in a post-reversion executive-led government? Or are
Financial Secretary Donald Tsang's striking public challenge to
Tung Chee-hwa to provide a clear public accounting of his views
on rolling back the Bill of Rights and related laws, and Tsang's
equally striking warning to China that it needed to provide a
convincing justification for changes to rights legislation, indicative
of a deeply troubled "liberal" constituency within a bureaucracy
that has long been publicly nonpartisan?93
What of the territory's rapidly growing and economically
essential professional and managerial classes? Having achieved a
measure of affluence and having received advanced education in
the West or in Western-style universities, they are the archetypal
constituency for political liberalization, the rule of law, and
electoral democracy in East Asia. And a large proportion of them
hold foreign passports, affording them an exit option if Chinese
rule proves too constraining. Conceivably, even relatively minor
92 For a more extended treatment of these issues, see deLisle & Lane, supra
note 18; Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule
of Law (II): The Battle Over "the People" and the Business Community in the
Transition to Chinese Rule 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. (forthcoming 1997). See
also Michael Steinberger, Pact on HK's Legal System has Not Put Fears to Rest,
BuS. TiMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at 8 (describing differing interpretations of business
domicile-shifting and other strategies as either fairly insignificant low cost
insurance and as indicative of serious lack of confidence in territory's future).
9 See, e.g., WEN WEI Po, Dec. 29, 1996, at A3 (stating P.R.C. official's
pledge that civil service would not be politicized); Amy Chew, HK's Tsang
Blasts "Meddling" by China, BUS. TIMEs (Malaysia), Jan. 29, 1997, at 4 (stating
Tsang's challenge to China, and Tsang's generally outspoken views); Gilley,
jumping the Gun, supra note 90, at 15 discussing Tsang's challenge to Tung);
Xu Xingtang, Roundup: HKSAR Taking Shape Smoothly, Xinhua, Mar. 23, 1997,
in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File (concerning Anson Chan and civil service continuity).
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failures to provide what these groups have come to expect, if read
as portents of betrayals and repressions to come, could prompt a
significant exodus.
On the other hand, many in this stratum are strongly
committed to Hong Kong, the leaders of the first generation of
true Hong Kong "belongers" with identities rooted more in the
territory than in China. And many remain very much part of a
Hong Kong culture that, until very recently, has been uniformly
and plausibly described as strikingly apolitical and only shallowly
invested in the notion of a rule of law (contrary assertions by the
British authorities and international business commentators
notwithstanding). Thus, here too we face the question of which
aspect of a Janus-faced identity will prove more relevant - with
the answer depending in no small part on the future actions of the
central P.R.C. authorities and the S.A.R. government.
Finally, a similar air of uncertainty surrounds a broad, ill-
defined, and much fought-over group, the "Hong Kong people."
Are the British colonial authorities and the territory's leading
democratic politicians right when they claim that "the people"
have come to embrace principles of democratic accountability,
popular elections for the legislature, and the Bill of Rights? If so,
China's announced plans to roll back recent legal and political
reforms threaten political turmoil and, therefore, economic crisis.
Or are China and its allies in the territory nearer the mark when
they assert that such support for late-colonial moves is illusory or
transient, and, moreover, that "the people" resent the instability
and uncertainty that the reforms pressed by Governor Patten and
supported by pro-democracy politicians have produced? If they
are, some of the changes will be met with widespread acceptance
and even a popular sigh of relief.
Again, there are signs that give both sides reason for confi-
dence and concern. Democratic politicians have won resounding
victories in the colony's most open elections, yet voter turnout
has been relatively low by world standards. Large public
demonstrations against a variety of Chinese moves that seem to
foretell an assault on civil and political liberties in the S.A.R. have
become commonplace. Still, opinion polls and anecdotal evidence
suggest a growing concern that the liberal and reformist agenda of
recent years has proven too provocative to China and, thus,
unwelcomely destabilizing.
Ultimately, all the effort that both sides have expended on
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"selling" their visions - Patten's resort to the kind of campaign
trail politics with which he, unlike his Foreign Office-trained
predecessors, has been comfortable, the activist and media-savvy
tactics of the new breed of pro-democracy politicians and liberal
journalists (and occasional journalist-politicians), and the sustained
counter-efforts from the colony's long-standing pm-Beijing press,
its newly founded pro-China political parties, the Hong Kong
branch of Xinhua, and the Chinese State Council's Hong Kong
and Macao Affairs Office - all seem not to have produced clearly
visible and deeply rooted allegiances to either camp. Across a
broad swath of the population, a common orientation appears to
remain ambiguously distrustful of the P.R.C., genuinely support-
ive of an end to the disturbing anachronism of colonial rule,
generally resigned to the inevitability of some unpalatable changes,
and broadly ambivalent about strongly partisan politics of any
stripe.
9 4
3.4. The Irrelevance of New Institutions
From a perspective that sees contemporary Hong Kong as a
territory in the midst of a long transition, the formal and legal
institutional changes that will occur around the date of the
colony's formal reversion appear likely to be relatively insignifi-
cant. And their lasting impact, if there is any, seems nearly
certain not to emerge until well beyond July 1, 1997.
On one hand, the basic outlines of the key legal and govern-
mental institutions - the legislature, the office of chief executive,
the civil service bureaucracy, the courts, and many of the laws for
the S.A.R. - have been clear for some time. Moreover, on this
view, there is relatively little left for the new laws and institutions
to do once they come formally into existence. For much of what
seems to matter about the transition has already been accom-
plished well in advance of 1997, in large part through the
"' On issues of popular and middle-class attitudes toward legal and political
aspects of Hong Kong's transition, and arguments about them, see generally,
Michael E. DeGloyer & Janet Lee Scott, The Myth of Political Apathy in Hong
Kong, 547 ANNALS 68 (1996); deLisle & Lane, Hong Kong's Endgame and the
Rule of Law (II), supra note 92; Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Borrowed
Place, Out 0/ Time: Identity, Democracy and Autonomy in Hong Kong
(forthcoming 1997); HKs Confidencefor the Future on Rise: Poll, Japan Econ.
Newswire, Feb. 3, 1997; Graham Hutchings, Hong Kong Depressed over
Looming Handover, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 3, 1996, at 10.
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operation of broad forces of economic integration and political
change, some of which are only tangentially related to the law and
politics of Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese rule. Further, given
that the formal legal and institutional structures of pre-reversion
Hong Kong appear, from this perspective, to have played only a
fairly modest role in defining Hong Kong's economic and political
life, there is little reason to expect that the implementation of new
arrangements will have a profound impact.
On the other hand, much that might matter in determining
the shape of Hong Kong's future order seems, on this view, to
depend upon elite strategies that have only begun to shift their
foci to post-reversion Hong Kong, and upon broader social
attitudes and political or economic pressures that remain fluid and
often unfathomable. In such circumstances, the first months, and
years, after the handover promise to reveal nothing definitive
about the success, failure, or character of the legal and institution-
al arrangements crafted for the S.A.R., or the longer term
trajectory of the territory's economy, politics, and interactions
with the mainland.
4. LAW'S PROMISED EMPIRE: LAW AND POLITICS, HONG
KONG AND BEYOND
Differing judgments about what constitute the crucial features
of transition era Hong Kong imply divergent expectations about
whether July 1, 1997 will arrive as a moment of dramatic
resolution, or merely roll by as one of many scenes in a long saga
of transformation. Such contrasting views also tend to align with
conflicting predictions and convictions about whether the formal
transfer of power will prove to be a moment of truth for the
S.A.R.'s legal and institutional structure, and whether Hong
Kong's future depends on the fate of those institutions and laws.
A "political alchemy" perspective and a "long transition"
perspective both offer reasonably clear, if basically irreconcilable,
positions on those questions. What both of those perspectives risk
obscuring - and (respectively) oversimplifying and undervaluing
- is the extraordinary degree to which the arrangements for
Hong Kong's transition, reversion, and operation as a S.A.R. have
been cast in distinctively legal forms and have centered on
distinctly legal issues. As the British empire withdraws from its
last great outpost and as the P.R.C. leaders who live next door to
the Chinese emperors' former palace reclaim a humiliating late
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imperial cession, the task of managing the transfer without causing
grave injury to Hong Kong or unacceptable affront to Chinese
sovereignty has promised a remarkably expansive empire for
law.9
5
4.1. Law's Central Role and the Politics of Law in Hong Kong's
Transition
The two foundational documents for Hong Kong's return to
Chinese rule and its functioning as a Chinese Special Administra-
tive Region are legal instruments, albeit of disputed or complex
status. As the British and many in Hong Kong see it, the Joint
Declaration is a full-dress, treaty-equivalent international agree-
ment by means of which Britain effects a transfer of sovereignty
over Hong Kong and China undertakes a variety of promises
concerning the transitional period and Hong Kong's post-1997
constitutional, legal, social, and economic orders. From China's
perspective, the Joint Declaration is something less than a treaty
and does not convey sovereignty over Hong Kong (which has
always been China's). And its substantive provisions are matters
of parallel declarations about how Britain is obliged to exercise
administrative authority over the territory until July 1, 1997, and
how China (unilaterally) intends to exercise its sovereign authority
beyond that date. Still, in China's official view, the Joint
Declaration remains unquestionably a document that sets forth
arrangements and undertakings with international legal effect.96
" See generally RONALD DwORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). For Dworkin,
law's empire is defined by an "interpretive and self-reflective attitude" addressed
to "politics in the broadest sense," but with the legal enterprise remaining
distinct from "ordinary" politics and free of the vices (from the law-as-integrity
perspective that Dworkin endorses) of mere conventionalism and pragmatism.
Moreover, Dworkin notes, when law fails, there can be adverse, sometimes
ruinous, material and moral consequences for the parties most immediately
affected and for the broader community in which such law operates. While
Dworkin's concerns are clearly jurisprudential and his focus is primarily Anglo-
American judicial interpretation, these points - concernig law's close
relationship to, yet distinctions from, politics and political v ues, and the
potentially serious and sometimes intangible, normative consejuences of law's
tailure - do resonate with the features of law's promised roles in Hong Kong's
transition that Section 4 here addresses.
96 See joint Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 1, 2. For statements of official
Chinese and British positions on the status of the Joint Declaration, see BEIJING
REVIEW, THE HONG KONG SOLUTION 59 (1985); HONG KONG: THE FACTS
- THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION 1 (1989); WHITE PAPER: A DRAFT
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In addition, the Basic Law is a major piece of P.R.C. legisla-
tion, adopted by the National People's Congress. From China's
perspective, it is nothing less - but also nothing more - than the
product of the highest constitutionally proper exercise of China's
sovereign legislative power. Although the Basic Law contains
promises that China will not amend it in ways that "contravene"
China's "established basic policies" on Hong Kong and pledges
that a Basic Law Committee including Hong Kong representatives
will be consulted before central Chinese authorities interpret or
amend the Basic Law, Chinese constitutional principles (and the
Basic Law itself) make the Basic Law subject to amendment by
subsequent legislation - although not by anything less. From
Hong Kong's perspective, the Basic Law is something more
formidable than a statute, or even a "mini-constitution" for the
S.A.R., as it is popularly called. It prescribes a structure and a set
of substantive principles that are beyond the power of Hong Kong
government institutions and the Hong Kong people to change.
For those in Hong Kong who have focused on this feature, the
mini-constitution has seemed to be troublingly inalterable. For
others who have placed more emphasis on the Basic Law's status
as a "mere" statute of the P.R.C., it is the document's vulnerabili-
ty to legislative change from Beijing that has been more disturb-
ing. Such concerns have prompted calls for amendments to the
Basic Law that would declare its provisions either equal in status
to the provisions of the P.R.C. constitution or subject to revision
by the people of Hong Kong.
7
Despite concerns about asymmetries of status and worries
about excessive rigidity or uncontrollable flexibility, the point
remains that all sides officially - and, it appears, actually - regard
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 7 (1984); Christopher Wren, China Vows to
Honor Hong Kong Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at A3.
' See Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 158-59 (setting forth NPC's power to
amend the Basic Law, including restriction on amendments contrary to China's
"established basic policies" on Hong Kong; role of Hong Kong people on Basic
Law Committee and in proposing amendments to the Basic Law); Xianfa, supra
note 32, arts. 2, 58, 62 (delineating NPC's general powers of legislation); Hong
Kong: Group's Plan Tackles Flaws in Basic Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept.
6, 1989 (describing calls to entrench Basic Law in P.R.C. law by granting its
provisions the equivalent of constitutional status); Lawmakers Create Pro-
Democracy Group, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at 7 (describing demand
for Hong Kong people to be allowed to make their own constitution).
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the Basic Law as an instrument with as much dignity and weight
as a P.R.C. statute can have, and as the principal constitutive
document for the S.A.R.
Moreover, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are not
only distinctly "legal" instruments. They are also documents that
primarily address issues of law and law-related matters. Among
the Joint Declaration's most prominent provisions are ones that
concern Hong Kong's international legal personality, and that
promise to preserve Hong Kong's common law legal system and
to continue in force many of the territory's pre-reversion laws."
Implementing and interpreting (and, by some lights, narrowing)
the Joint Declaration's sketchy undertakings, the Basic Law
devotes much of its text to spelling out the constitutional details
of how law-making power for the S.A.R. is to be allocated among
P.R.C. state organs in Beijing, the S.A.R.'s Chief Executive, and
the local Hong Kong legislature. Another substantial portion
addresses what the Joint Declaration's promised "high degree of
autonomy" in judicial affairs is to mean in terms of Hong Kong
courts' affirmative powers, and the limits imposed by the denial
of jurisdiction over "acts of state" and by Beijing's retention of
significant authority to interpret and amend the Basic Law.
Other much-discussed articles cover the status of the major
international human rights covenants in Hong Kong law (as well
as Hong Kong citizens' legal rights more generally) and laws
proscribing sedition and subversion."
Further, laws have been both the focus and the principal
medium of pre-reversion politics in Hong Kong. Throughout the
1980s, Hong Kong politics was about the Joint Declaration
process, the drafting of the Basic Law and the conflicts that
swirled around them. During the 1990s, the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law have remained politically important, serving as the
touchstones to which all sides have turned in nearly every major
political conflict over laws or institutions in Hong Kong's late
transitional years. In addition, the key controversies of the period
have revolved to an extraordinary degree around specific Hong
Kong laws that have themselves often been concerned with
9' See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, paras. 3(3), 3(6), 3(7), 3(9), 3(10),
annex I, § II, VI, XI.
99 See id. para. 3, annex I; Basic Law, supra note 4, arts. 2-6, 8, 11-23, 26-
104, 116, 150-160.
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defining and assigning law-making and adjudicative power.
These traits were evident in the row over Patten's political
reforms. The focus of the clash was proposed legislation to
govern elections to the last colonial Legco - an organ that was
playing an increasingly significant role in colonial Hong Kong's
law-making and that was slated to become the S.A.R.'s first
legislature. China and its supporters attacked Patten's franchise-
expanding reforms on specifically legal grounds, declaring them
inconsistent with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. They
claimed that the broad electorates for nine new functional
constituencies entailed a premature and illegal move toward
universal suffrage for the territory's principal representative body.
On the other side of the dispute, Patten defended his moves to
give law-making a more democratic basis as legally sound
interpretations of capacious Joint Declaration, Basic Law, and
other NPC legislative provisions governing the structure of
constituencies for choosing members of a through-train-riding
legislature. More broadly, the governor and pro-democracy
politicians in the territory argued that the reforms were a step
toward a more accountable government, which they saw as a vital
underpinning to the rule of law.
When China decreed that the through train would be derailed
and a Provisional Legislature appointed to take office on July 1,
1997, the issues and arguments remained law-centered. At stake,
of course, were still the composition, powers, and claim to
authority of the S.A.R.'s initial legislative body. China and its
allies asserted that, in light of the Patten reforms' illegality, the
Basic Law and the NPC Decisions (as well as China's general
powers as Hong Kong's sovereign) authorized an appointed
provisional body, despite the absence of any reference to such an
institution in the relevant legal texts. Many leading Hong Kong
politicians and the colonial government countered with a
continued defense of the legal propriety of the Patten reforms and
an attack on the Provisional Legislature as without legal founda-
tion and lacking the electoral pedigree that the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law contemplated for the S.A.R.'s legislatures. 110
100 For a more extended discussion of the issues addressed in this section,
see deLisle & Lane, Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (), supra note
83. In the political reform dispute, the most central legal provisions were Basic
Law art. 68 (which the Chinese side cited for its mandate that Legco selection
methods "shall be specified in light of the actual situation" in the S.A.R. and
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The controversy surrounding the Bill of Rights Ordinance and
other reforms to civil and political liberties-restricting laws was
marked by a similar pattern. The China and pro-China side
asserted that the Bill of Rights sought to create a new kind of
quasi-constitutional law in Hong Kong, standing above and
overriding ordinary ordinances. And, they added, the whole
package of late colonial liberalization of public order and security
laws, along with the Bill of Rights itself, violated the Joint
Declaration's and Basic Law's provisions on legal continuity.
China construed those provisions as mandating that the major
laws in force in Hong Kong at the time of the Sino-British
agreement would remain in force throughout the transition (or,
at the very least, as not promising that any colonial laws substan-
tially altered after 1984 would be received into S.A.R. law).
Their opponents in the political conflict again countered with
equally law-focused arguments, maintaining that the Bill of Rights
Ordinance was nothing "higher" than ordinary Hong Kong
legislation, albeit of unusually great scope and importance. That
is, it did nothing more than override some contrary legislation of
equal status, establish a rule for judicial construction - not
supersession - of future legislation, and provide conventional
administrative and common law rights to judicial review. As to
the amendments liberalizing specific laws on civil and political
rights, British authorities and Hong Kong liberals found nothing
persuasive in the suggestion that the Joint Declaration somehow
froze certain unspecified domestic legislation in place (while
clearly leaving the colonial government free to enact or amend
other laws). And they invoked the Joint Declaration's and Basic
Law's commitment to accepting into S.A.R. law the principles of
the major United Nations Human Rights Covenants as a mandate
for adopting some of the disputed legislative changes.0 1
"in accordance with the principle of orderly progress," but which also contains
other language favored by China's adversaries, principally that Legco "shall be
constituted by election" - a phrase that tracks Joint Declaration Annex I, S I,
and the NPC Decision concerning the formation of the first S.A.R. legislature.
Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 68.
'0' The key legal provisions in this controversy were Joint Declaration
paragraphs 3(3), 3(5), Annex I, 9 II, XIII (concerning laws previously in force
and individual rights provisions); and Basic Law articles 8, 39, 24-42, 160
(concerning continuity in Hong Kong's laws, the status of the provisions of the
U.N. human rights covenants, the catalogue of S.A.R. residents' rights, and
issues of conflict between the Basic Law and laws previously in force), and, of
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A similar dynamic, although with a different alignment of
parties, characterized the controversy surrounding the Court of
Final Appeal for the S.A.R. At the center of the conflict were
proposed ordinances to establish the court, one rejected by a
majority of Legco in 1991 and another that passed Legco in 1995.
Here, China and the British authorities defended, as compatible
with the Basic Law and the rule of law, bills that restricted the
number of foreign judges on the bench to one and that (in the
1995 version) delayed establishment of the court until the final
transition. The court, they maintained, satisfied all the explicit
requirements of the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, and
saved Hong Kong's rule of law system from the perils of a legal
vacuum that might occur if the court or other S.A.R. institutions
were not ready to begin operation on July 1, 1997.
Some of Hong Kong's most ardent liberal politicians, mean-
while, attacked the court arrangement, again by resorting to legal
arguments and arguments that assumed a special and central role
for law. They criticized the proposed legislation as the product
of a secret, perhaps even lawless Sino-British deal that stood in
sharp contrast to the open, if Hong Kong-excluding, process that
had produced the treaty-like Joint Declaration. They also decried
the proposed legislation as inconsistent with the Basic Law's text
(and a parallel provision in the Joint Declaration), which provided
that the Court "may as required invite judges from other common
law jurisdictions to sit on the Court of Final Appeal." They
argued that such language prohibited (by its use of the plural as
well as by the flexibility inherent in the phrase "as required") a
fixed ceiling of one foreign national on the bench, and permitted
at least two -and more where that was necessary to the Court's
carrying out effectively its functions. More broadly, they
dismissed the Court bills as corrosive of the rule of law for Hong
Kong, rejecting the British authorities' arguments to the con-
trary.
10 2
The same sort of strongly law-focused discourse extended to
the related (if less intense) debate about acts of state. When some
in Hong Kong's pro-democracy camp raised the fear that China
course, the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and the Societies and Public Order
Ordinances (as amended).
10' The provisions at the center of this controversy, and quoted in the text
above, were article 82 of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration annex I, 5 III.
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would further compromise the rule of law by construing provi-
sions insulating acts of state from judicial review so broadly as to
immunize the future S.A.R. government and P.R.C. companies
from significant judicial review and civil suits, others of broadly
similar political persuasion rejected this line of argument in favor
of alternative analyses that were equally legal in substance and
spirit. They criticized the proponents of the more critical and
skeptical line for, in effect, muddying clear legal waters. They
preferred to rely upon the persistence of the relatively narrow
contours of established common law doctrine, and not to risk
triggering yet another costly clash with China over yet another
question of statutory construction.'013
Finally, the recent political skirmishes concerning the S.A.R.
government-in-waiting have been fought in similarly law-related
terms. When Tung Chee-hwa pointedly eschewed the title "Chief
Executive-designate" in favor of his official post-July 1 moniker of
"Chief Executive" and when the Provisional Legislature-to-be
asserted its authority to consider legislation for the Hong Kong
S.A.R. before the formal date of reversion, Hong Kong critics
charged that such moves violated the framework legal documents
which contemplated no such head-start in the exercise of sovereign
authority by S.A.R. organs. For the British, a degree of guberna-
torial cooperation with an in-coming executive was permissible
and lawful, but allowing the usurpation of sovereign law-making
authority before the treaty-specified moment of transfer of title
was quite another matter. This distinction was, in part, a legal
one about what the British sovereign had undertaken by treaty,
and what existing Hong Kong law permitted: since the Joint
Declaration and Hong Kong's colonial constitution and laws
contemplate that, until July 1, 1997, Legco remains the only
authorized legislative body for Hong Kong, it would be improper,
even unlawful, for Hong Kong's colonial government to cooperate
with the aggressive new body in Shenzhen.
In the territory's liberal and democratic circles, the whole
affair more generally reinforced concerns about China's regard for
any of the promises made with respect to post-reversion Hong
Kong. For them, the P.R.C.'s moves suggested an attitude of
lawlessness that undercut the credibility of the largely legal
arrangements that the P.R.C. had accepted as setting the terms for
103 The statute at issue was the Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 19.
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the territory's future. When the China and pro-China camp
rejected charges that the P.R.C. was grabbing power unlawfully,
dismissing them as impermissible interference in an internal
Chinese matter, their position seemed to suggest (especially to
Hong Kong liberals and democrats) an air of indifference to legal
limits. Yet, here too, there was a distinctly legal element to the
P.R.C.'s argument. The claim was rooted firmly in the interna-
tional legal position that China had long embraced and had made
sure to enshrine in the Joint Declaration - that Hong Kong was,
and always had been, subject to China's sovereignty and that the
territory's governance, thus, had always been legally a function
that China was free to take on whenever it so chose.
1°4
4.2. Political Bases of a Turn to Law
The broad scope of law's promised empire in managing the
colony's reversion and structuring its operation as a Chinese
S.A.R. - together with the oddly law-centered politics that it has
spawned - is perhaps the most striking feature of transitional
Hong Kong. It is more distinctive and arguably more noteworthy
than the legal and political uncertainty or the debates about the
modesty or majesty of real change that almost always accompany
sudden shifts in the locus of formal sovereign authority, whether
they occur through decolonization, revolution, imperial acquisi-
tion or other means. °5
Several primarily political factors, contributing in uncertain
proportions, appear to underlie the remarkable turn to law in the
process of handling Hong Kong's transition. The pressure of a
politically inalterable deadline for reversion, in place from the
earliest phases of negotiation over Hong Kong's future status (and
even before), and the prospect of a decade and a half period
between initial agreement and formal transfer of authority made
the construction of an elaborate legal framework more feasible
and seemingly necessary. On one hand, the early acceptance of
the July 1, 1997 date for Hong Kong's return to China effectively
ended the possibility of protracted negotiations over whether the
104 On these "sovereignty issues," see generally, Joint Declaration, supra
note 1, paras. 1, 2, and Basic Law, supra note 4, art. 1. See also Gilley, Jumping
the Gun, supra note 90.
'05 Those more common place features are the foci of Sections 2 and 3
supra.
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territory would be handed back (and in return for what). An
impasse on such matters, of course, would have postponed
indefinitely work on any legal arrangements to govern the
transition and its aftermath. On the other hand, the long lag
between the settlement of the sovereignty question and the
ultimate transfer of authority meant that there would be time
enough to negotiate, fight over, and perhaps put in place an
elaborate structure of laws and institutions. More importantly,
the lag meant that failing to do so risked an extended period of
serious uncertainty that could leave the territory suspended for
years in a ruinous limbo.
The fortuitous conjunction of official embraces of "legality" on
both sides of the vanishing border also created an environment
conducive to a resort to legal forms and norms in addressing the
Hong Kong question. On the Hong Kong side, the colonial order
accorded a special pride of place to the "rule of law," and perhaps
never more than during the period of the turn to law to govern
the transition process. In the 1980s, the drive to clean-up
corruption in Hong Kong had achieved considerable success, and
consideration of moves to eliminate illiberal and discriminatory
colonial laws was underway. At the same time, Hong Kong's
increasingly internationalized and service-oriented economy made
the colony's highly regarded legal environment seem even more
central to its success. And there was, as yet, no significantly
implemented or politically salient principle of "democracy" to
rival the "rule of law" in Hong Kong's pantheon of political
values. On the other side, China during the same period was at
the apogee of its post-Mao drive to create a new socialist legality
compatible with its broader quest to build a modern economy and
to secure an end to ideological excess. During the 1980s especial-
ly, an unprecedented torrent of new laws and regulations was
pouring forth from legislative and administrative bodies. The
judicial system and the number of lawyers were expanding
exponentially. And, following on denunciations of the lawlessness
of the Cultural Revolution decade, Party rhetoric was full of
commitments to developing laws and ruling by law.
Further, the lack of political trust, and the rapidly growing
imbalance of power, between China and its Hong Kong support-
ers and agents, on one side, and the British and Hong Kong
liberals and democrats, on the other, pointed (especially for the
latter group) to an embrace of law, faute de mieux. In that
19971
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political context, casting arrangements for Hong Kong's future in
legal forms recognizable to and, it was to be hoped, recognized,
and supported by much of the rest of the world was perhaps the
most that Britain and local proponents of a relatively autonomous
and open Hong Kong could achieve in their efforts to constrain
China.
For China and its agents and allies, the context also suggested
some virtues in a potentially constraining turn to law. Putting its
Hong Kong policy in legal form allowed China an additional,
relatively persuasive means to signal to the world its avowed
benign intentions toward the territory. It also gave China and its
Hong Kong spokesmen and supporters an additional, seemingly
"neutral" and less purely "political" basis for checking and
challenging the liberalizing and democratizing excesses that China
feared the departing colonial authorities would commit, with the
connivance of some of the territory's "subversive" politicians and
activists. For a PR.C. regime that has not been completely
indifferent to international opinion and pressure, there is surely
something attractive in being able to denounce moves toward
greater democratization and expanded civil liberties as lawless
actions or breaches of international legal promises, and not just as
moves that China has found politically unpalatable.
4.3. Law and Hong Kong-s Transition: Issues and Interests
Beyond the "1997 Question"
Questions of its origins aside, law's promised central role in
steering Hong Kong through its transition has deepened and
diversified the interests outsiders have in Hong Kong's transition
to Chinese rule, and its aftermath. Much of that stake is obvious
and material. A disruptive transition could put at immediate risk
the economic health of the world's eighth largest trading entity
and one of the main hubs of investment and commerce in the
world's most dynamic region. That, in turn, would imperil the
continuation of the rapid growth of China's vast economy in
which Hong Kong has played a vital role. The consequences, of
course, would be substantial for investors, traders, and consumers
everywhere. More indirectly, a heavy-handed Chinese approach
to Hong Kong's civil and political liberties and derogations form
its legally promised autonomy could mean that Western investors
and traders would again face the kinds of economic concerns
abroad and political pressures and legal restrictions at home that
[Vol. 18:1
POLITICAL ALCHEMY
prompted some to back away, albeit briefly, form pursuing deals
with China after the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989.
Strategically, a troubled post-reversion era in Hong Kong
could bring dangerous regional and global repercussions.
Additional strains in the troubled U.S.-China relationship would
surely follow. Some mechanisms for a U.S. response are already
set forth in the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, which authoriz-
es the president to deny Hong Kong much of the favorable trade,
visa and other privileges the territory currently enjoys (and to
subject it instead to the treatment accorded the rest of the P.R.C.)
if the president finds that China has failed to keep Hong Kong
"sufficiently autonomous" to justify Hong Kong's separate
treatment. Early hints of a broader reaction perhaps can be found
in a recent federal district court decision denying an extradition
request from Hong Kong, and expressing concern about cooperat-
ing where "[a]lready there are signs that the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region judicial system will appear very much like
the Chinese judicial system." China's reaction to such Western
criticism or sanctions is even easier to anticipate. It would
doubtless include a good deal of nationalist chest-thumping and a
redux of the familiar attack on Western moves as affronts to
Chinese sovereignty and impermissible interference in what China
deems its internal affairs.106
A problem-filled transition and rising repression in Hong
Kong, and an accompanying deterioration in U.S.-China ties
would also bode ill for mainland-Taiwan relations. With the "one
country, two systems" model for reintegrating Taiwan thus cast
into doubt and China resorting to a more aggressive and intransi-
gent nationalism, one of the most volatile issues in the region
would become even more explosive.
To many interested observers, such global and regional
106 Hong Kong Policy Act, 22 U.S.C. 5722(a) (1992); Lui v. United States,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 801 at *25-*26 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
5225 (1st Cir.) (denying extradition of Hong Kong citizen Jerry Lui, and
finding that Senate ratification of treaty permitting extradition to British-ruled
Hong Kong could not be construed to authorize extradition, in effect, to a
sovereign other than the treaty's signatory, whose credibility and trust - and
the character of whose legal system - the Senate had not weighed and judged);
The United States Has No Right to Interfere in Hong Kong Affairs, TA KUNG
PAO, Mar. 14, 1997, at 2 (criticizing congressional criticism and skepticism
about China's likely post-1997 treatment of Hong Kong as impermissible
interference in Chinese internal affairs).
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economic and political concerns appear to be closely bound up
with the fate of the law, legality and the legal arrangements for
the future S.A.R. in Hong Kong. At the very least, a widely
shared belief holds that Hong Kong's "rule of law" environment
is a vital part of its economic success, and that moves undermining
a rule of law for economic affairs would risk killing the goose that
has, for China and for so many others, laid so many golden eggs.
A somewhat more narrowly accepted perspective sees a serious
threat to the economic rule of law (and therefore prosperity) in
potential retrenchments of Hong Kong citizens' civil and political
liberties and the S.A.R.'s autonomy. And, as the U.S.-Hong Kong
Policy Act and the U.S. district court's extradition decision in part
suggest, a pervasive view in the legally-minded (on some accounts,
law-obsessed) West sees close, if complex, connections between
rule-of-law principles and a host of political "goods," including
democratic values, human rights, and, indirectly, international
political stability. On this view, an erosion of Hong Kong's legal
order or a betrayal of legal promises about Hong Kong's post-1997
governance are one possible route - and perhaps a relatively
likely one - to disorder and repression in Hong Kong and
diplomatic tensions and multilateral conflict spreading beyond the
region.
These legal aspects of primarily non-legal concerns still do not
capture the full extent of the stake that much of the outside world
- or at least its liberal and legalist corners - holds in the
fulfillment of law's promised roles in Hong Kong's transition.
Also on display, and on trial, is the capacity of law to manage and
shape a delicate, complex and potentially chaotic process of
change. The arrangements developed through the Joint Declara-
tion, the Basic Law, the controversial legislative moves following
in their wake, and the law-centered Hong Kong politics of the
1980s and 1990s collectively define one of the major Promethean
projects that law has undertaken in the contemporary world.
Pursuing such an ambitious agenda, having had such ambivalent
origins, and facing a presumably inhospitable environment at the
fault lines between radically different ideologies, legal cultures, and
levels of political power, law's imperial program for transitional
Hong Kong may also be among its more Herculean tasks.
In those precincts around the globe where the rule of law and
rule by law are valued, whether instrumentally or as goods in
their own right, there is a strong rooting interest in the outcome.
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If the legal framework and the public and official commitment to
law succeed in steering Hong Kong through the jolt of reversion
and the longer process of transition, or even if norms of legality
and a liberal legalism survive in Hong Kong only as resilient
irritants to a recalcitrant P.R.C.-controlled regime, then it will be
testimony to the powerful attraction and tenacity of those ideas
even in supposedly unfriendly political and civilizational contexts.
The visible reach of law's empire will have extended a bit further,
and its grasp will have become a bit firmer, and its versatility and
adaptability a bit clearer.
